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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this research was to develop a methodology for creating cyber 
situational assessment between a physical network and its virtual copy to enable cyber 
situational awareness (CSA) in the Mapping, Awareness, and Virtualization Network 
Administrator Training Tool (MAVNATT) Awareness Module. The research focused on 
the nodal attributes of a network that contribute most toward creating CSA while also 
lending to virtualization. This work describes a conceptual system design and toolset that 
enables users to collect, normalize, and store network attributes in a non-relational 
database, and analyzes open-source software that can be used as its intermediary build 
platform. We also describe a conceptual design for the MAVNATT Awareness Module, 
which queries, selects, and stores the nodal attributes in a relational database schema for 
tracking and management. The relational schema in this work was written in MySQL and 
reverse engineered using Oracle’s SQL Developer to check for correctness. 
Documentation of the schema tables and their relationships, cross-referenced with a 
matrix of the attributes that can be virtualized in VirtualBox, accompany the provided 
SQL code. 
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The Mapping, Awareness, and Virtualization Network Administrator Training Tool 
(MAVNATT) is a system created at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to solve the 
problem of network administrators training. It is to the network administrator’s advantage 
to train on the very network that they manage. Yet there are consequences to making 
mistakes on a tactical network, such as cutting off communications accidentally, disabling 
critical parts of the system, and allowing unrestricted access where it should be controlled. 
This possibility makes it dangerous for tactical commanders to allow administrators to train 
on their operational networks. MAVNATT solves this problem by making a virtual copy 
of the network, providing a realistic experience for the network administrator. The 
virtualization is meant to accurately replicate the network that the administrator manages, 
allowing them to train on their network without consequence (McBride, 2015). 
MAVNATT uses three separate modules—Mapping, Awareness, and 
Virtualization—to conduct different tasks. To make this system more useful, the 
Awareness Module is meant to assist the network administrator and the trainer by 
presenting them with the situational awareness of the network. This is to allow them to see 
activity within their operational network, the virtual network, and the differences between 
the two. 
This research seeks to expand on the original requirements of MAVNATT by 
defining Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) in this context and to find an effective and 
efficient way to achieve CSA for the tactical operator and trainer. The following research 
questions are investigated: 
1. Primary Question 
How can CSA of a tactical network be achieved? 
2. Secondary Question 
What kind of information needs to be collected, and how should it be analyzed and 
visualized to produce effective CSA?  
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A. OBJECTIVES 
There are two main objectives for this work. The first objective is to determine an 
efficient method to provide the tactical network administrator and trainer with CSA. The 
second objective is to implement a module for MAVNATT that provides baseline 
configurational awareness to the network administrator. 
B. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Cyberspace is a man-made environment which requires the cyber operator to 
constantly train in order to maintain proficiency with regard to their tasking. For defensive 
cyber operators, CSA is critical to the defense of their cyber terrain, as a network cannot 
be defended without knowing how the adversary might act upon or is moving within that 
network. CSA begins with having a working understanding of the cyber terrain and is 
complete when the current processes within that terrain are known. 
Currently, tactical network administrators are not considered defensive cyber 
operators because they often do not receive the training, experience, or even the tools to 
defend their networks. Yet tactical network administrators are the first line of defense for 
their networks and they need to become defensive cyber operators for their terrain. This 
work benefits the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy by advancing 
MAVNATT with a design for its Awareness Module and its infrastructure, which will 
ultimately provide tactical network administrators with a tool that they can use to gain CSA 
of their cyber terrain and train without adversely affecting that terrain. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following manner: 
The second chapter, “Background and Previous Work,” outlines the previous work 
that has been done with situational awareness and how it can be applied to computer 
networks. The chapter then reviews three different Security Information and Event 
Manager (SIEM) systems, and how they contribute to network administrator situational 
awareness. We end the chapter with an overview of MAVNATT itself. 
 3 
Chapter III, “Awareness Module Design,” describes a conceptual model for the 
new Awareness Module in terms of the original MAVNATT goals to include information 
and process flows. Also described is a design for the MAVNATT system infrastructure 
and how OSSIM can be used an intermediary platform to reduce MAVNATT’s 
development time. 
The next chapter, “MAVNATT Relational Schema Implementation,” discusses the 
types of awareness attributes with regard to training, the selection of the various attributes 
of a node that can be virtualized, the relational schema design considerations, and the 
schema implementation. 
The thesis ends with “Conclusion and Future Work,” which covers the 
accomplishments and limitations of the research. The future work section describes 
possible improvements and refinements to the MAVNATT system. 
  
 4 
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II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
According to Tadda & Slaerno (2010), situational awareness (SA) “is the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future to 
enable decision superiority” (p. 17). This expands on Endsley’s (1995) original definition 
that SA is the understanding or “state of knowledge” that an actor has when he knows what 
is going on around him. SA is what people use as a base for decision making when 
proposing an action to take within the near future. Endsley (1995) states that SA is created 
via a phased hierarchy of escalating knowledge through three discrete levels (p. 36). 
Endsley’s (1995) first level of SA knowledge is “the perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space” (p. 36). The volume of time and space 
considered for an environment provides a context by which to determine what elements 
will be influencing factors to a situation. For example, a person in a daylight street-crossing 
situation would look for anything that could potentially intersect the path he/she is 
considering taking across that street. To decide if it is safe to cross the street, the presence 
of cars are influencing factors and the clouds in the sky are not. 
The second level of knowledge from Endsley’s (1995) definition is the 
comprehension of the meaning of those elements. Referring back to the previous example, 
just because cars are present on the street does not mean that it is not safe to cross. The 
speed and direction of travel of the cars present give meaning to how much they influence 
the safety of the situation.  
The final level of knowledge from Endsley’s (1995) SA definition is the projection 
of the status of those elements in the near future. Referring again to the street-crossing 
situation, the person will project the speed and the direction of the cars present to see if 
they could intersect his/her intended path during the crossing window.  
The person, detecting the elements relevant to the situation, comprehending their 
meaning, and projecting their status in the near future, is now fully aware of the crossing 
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situation. This state of knowledge enables a fourth level of knowledge that McGuinness 
and Foy call resolution, which enables decision makers to reach a decision on what action 
to take (as cited in Tadda & Salerno, 2010, p. 19). The person in the street-crossing example 
now has the information required to resolve whether a safe crossing is possible and to act 
accordingly. 
Endsley (1995) notes that SA does not take into account all of a person’s knowledge 
and it only refers to the knowledge of the “state of a dynamic environment” (p. 36). The 
hierarchical model of SA can be thought of as a two-part process where in the first part 
information is gathered for processing within a second, cognitive process. Endsley (1995) 
defines situation assessment to refer to both parts as a “process of achieving, acquiring, or 
maintaining situation awareness” (p. 36). Tadda and Salerno (2010) summarize SA as 
being a cognitive process that takes place in the minds of humans as it is a state of 
knowledge and note that situation assessment is a technical “process or set of processes 
[that] lends itself to automated techniques” (p. 16). 
1. Cyber Situational Awareness 
Cyber is defined as being “of, relating to, or involving computers or computer 
networks” (“Cyber,” 2018). Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) is “a subset of SA which 
concerns the cyber environment” and includes awareness of interesting or suspicious 
activity of that environment (Franke & Brynielsson, 2014, p. 20). CSA is very useful to 
stakeholders of computer networks as it helps them to determine and maintain the security 
of those networks (Franke & Brynielsson, 2014, p. 19). Since CSA is a subset of SA, it 
follows that the processes of CSA are subsets of SA. The production of CSA, like SA, takes 
place via a two-part process where information is first gathered, and then refined by 
computer systems for presentation to the network’s stakeholder. The stakeholder fuses that 
information with other knowledge gained from outside the network via cognitive 
processing to create CSA. Since cognitive processing produces CSA and takes place within 
the mind, computers cannot attain CSA. However, they can gather the necessary 
information from the network, refine it, and present it to stakeholders to enable them to 
achieve CSA (Tadda & Salerno, 2010, p. 16). 
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2. Cyber Situational Assessment 
The initial process of creating CSA is cyber situational assessment, defined here as 
“the process of collecting and refining cyber data to enable the acquisition or maintenance 
of cyber situation awareness” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36; Tadda & Salerno, 2010, p. 16). To 
achieve cyber situational assessment, it is necessary to first identify the information to 
perceive based on the context of the network in use. Table 1 lists examples of entities and 
data sources that provide elements required for this purpose. In general, Giacobe notes that 
fixed observable data can come from any cyber security sensor or other routine IT-support 
data source, such as network-based IDS, host-based IDS, host log file data, baseline 
configuration information to include operating systems and patches installed, and physical 
system locations. In addition to these data sources, stakeholders also collect soft data from 
sources external to the network such as user observations and cyber intelligence in order 
to generate cyber situation assessment (Giacobe, 2010). 
The next step in cyber situation assessment is to give meaning to the individual 
elements perceived. The elements’ meanings are then fused together to understand the state 
of the situation (Endsley, 1995; Giacobe, 2010). To perform this data fusion, Giacobe 
suggests using the Joint Director of Laboratories (JDL) Data Fusion Model, depicted in 
Figure 1. The JDL Data Fusion Model provides a framework for combining various sources 
of data to create a better understanding of an observed situation by using algorithms to 
combine the data and infer the meaning of the data in context at each level of data fusion 
(Giacobe, 2010). The JDL model defines six data fusion levels, as follows: 
• Level 0: Source Pre-Processing normalizes and aligns source data to 
prepare it for analysis (Giacobe, 2010). 
• Level 1: Object Refinement combines the multi-source “data to identify 
individual security events” (Giacobe, 2010, p. 2). 
• Level 2: Situation Refinement “combine[s] multiple individual entities to 
provide a current-state system perspective” (Giacobe, 2010, p. 2). 
• Level 3: Threat Refinement “provide[s] [the] capability to predict future 
states of the system” (Giacobe, 2010, p. 2). 
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• Level 4: Process Refinement “addresses the system’s capability to task 
sensors and maintain their [rules]”, refining the previous processes 
(Giacobe, 2010, p. 2).  
• Level 5: Cognitive Refinement / Human Computer Interface is how the 
human analyst incorporates information from the data fusion system 
(Giacobe, 2010). 
Table 1. Examples of Entities and Source Data. Adapted from Giacobe 
(2010). 
Entity Source Data Examples 
Defended Host 
• Physical Location 
• Hardware Details 
• Operating System 
• List of Patches Applied 
• Application Level Software Installed 
• CPU and Memory Utilization 
• Applications Currently Running 
• End-User Account Access Data 
• Security Log Data 
• Classification of Data Stored on the 
System 
Intrusion 
• IDS Type and Location 
• Source Address 
• Destination Address 
• Attack Method 
• Time of Attack 
Attacker 
• Source Address(es) 
• Methods of Attack 
Flows of Data 
• Source and Destination Addresses 
• Type of Traffic (Protocols Used) 
• Traffic Volume 




Figure 1. Joint Director of Laboratories Data Fusion Model. 
Source: Giacobe (2010). 
B. SECURITY INFORMATION AND EVENT MANAGERS 
As discussed in the previous section, cyber situational assessment requires the 
fusion of diverse sources of fixed observable network data. Security Information and Event 
Managers (SIEMs) are software suites that provide a range of capabilities for this process. 
According to one current market definition, SIEMs are “defined by the customer’s need to 
analyze event data in real time for the early detection of targeted attacks and data breaches, 
and to collect, store, analyze, investigate and report on event data for incident response, 
forensics and regulatory compliance” (Kavanagh & Bussa, 2017). 
1. Principles of a SIEM 
According to Holik, Horalek, Neradova, Zitta, & Marik (2015) in their article 
reviewing SIEM features and principles, a SIEM solution must contain or provide a source 
of fixed observable data, a log collection service, normalization of the logs and data 
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collected, both a rule and correlation engine, log storage, and system monitoring. Figure 2 
depicts the architecture of these components. 
 
Figure 2. SIEM Architecture. Source: Holik et al. (2015). 
Normalization of the logs and data must be provided so that incoming data can be 
converted into a common format to enable its analysis (Bhatt, Manadhata, & Zomlot, 2014, 
p. 36). A rule and correlation engine then reacts to and correlates the normalized data using 
various algorithms ranging from expert systems to neural networks (Giacobe, 2010). 
SIEMs can be open source or commercial, and offer a wide range of capabilities 
depending on security requirements and budget constraints. They generally incorporate or 
have the ability to interface with networking tools such as network mappers, firewalls, 
vulnerability scanners and analyzers, intrusion detection and prevention systems, 
configuration compliance solutions, and databases (Holik et al., 2015). While their 
architectures are generally the same, SIEMs do not use the same tools and techniques, and 
may serve niche areas or provide a less robust set of tools (Nicolett & Kavanagh, 2011). 
Due to the differences in features and pricing, network administrators may need to use a 
combination of SIEMs and tools to cover their security requirements. 
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2. SIEM Examples 
This section presents three examples of open source SIEMs to demonstrate the wide 
variety of technologies that can be used to create a cyber situational assessment. The first 
is Apache Metron, which employs Big Data tools and is fully scalable to accommodate 
large industrial applications. The second is SIEMonster, a SIEM that seeks to deliver a full 
range of security capabilities to end users. The third is OSSIM, an open source version of 
Unified Security Management, AlienVault’s commercial product. 
a. Apache Metron 
According to Vetticaden (2016), “Apache Metron is a cyber security application 
framework that provides organizations the ability to ingest, process and store diverse 
security data feeds at scale in order to detect cyber anomalies and enable organizations to 
rapidly respond to them.” Metron was released in 2016, and the current release is 0.4.1. 
Metron has prebuilt installations for CentOS 6 and Ubuntu 14.04, while instructions for 
deployment to other platforms such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) are available (Foley, 
2017; Berman, 2018; Vetticaden, 2017). 
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Figure 3. Apache Metron Logical Components. Source: Vetticaden (2016). 
Metron’s scalability is achieved through the use of a Big Data toolset and can be 
logically broken down into four components. The first is telemetry ingestion, which can 
take two paths. One path uses Apache NiFi (Figure 3, 1a), which can be run as a single 
Java Virtual Machine instance, or in a cluster to fit Metron’s deployment scale. NiFi is 
used to manage the incoming flow of data from the network (Apache Software Foundation, 
n.d.). In Metron, NiFi receives network endpoint generated logs to include hosts, firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems, and antivirus platforms. The other path of telemetry ingestion 
is via network tap to collect raw network packet data (Figure 3, 1b) (Vetticaden, 2016).  
Both of these paths flow into Metron’s second component, which is Apache Kafka 
(Figure 3, 2), a distributed message buffering system that organizes the telemetry into 
different “topics.” Like NiFi, Kafka can deploy as a cluster to meet the Metron’s 
deployment scale. Each server within the Kafka cluster can have one or more 
topic partitions, which act as a buffer that maintains the log messages in the order they 
were received. The log messages in each topic are replicated across a desired number of 
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topic partitions so that the logs can be consumed by Metron in a parallelized way 
(Sookocheff, 2015). 
The third logical component of Metron handles message processing (Vetticaden, 
2016), which is done by Apache Storm, “a task parallel, open source distributed computing 
system” (DeZyre, 2015, para. 10). Storm processes incoming message streams through a 
topology. The topology starts with the Kafka cluster that the information is read from and 
progresses to all of the various “bolts” along the intended path of the topology (Soni, 2018). 
These bolts in the topology are the processes required to parse and normalize (Figure 3, 3), 
enrich (Figure 3, 4), and label (Figure 3, 5) the incoming messages. The enrichment of the 
message involves adding metadata such as the geographic locations of the traffic’s source 
and destination to the log itself. Any threat intelligence that correlates to the message is 
also added to the log and the message becomes “labeled.” Any telemetry that meets criteria 
will then initiate an alert (Figure 3, 6), which is indexed in Elasticsearch and stored in a 
Hadoop Distributed File System for analysis.  
The final logical component of Metron is its user interface (Figure 3, 7), which 
provides real-time searches, security dashboards, data modeling and engineering, and 
system access to modify and customize NiFI, Kafka, and Storm settings (Vetticaden, 
2016). 
b. SIEMonster 
SIEMonster is a fully scalable SIEM framework that is based on a comprehensive 
collection of open source software, which provides nearly every service a SIEM can have 
(Table 2), although a paid version provides advanced correlation and reporting capabilities. 
The current version of SIEMonster is 3.0 and uses the CoreOS operating system, which is 
designed for clustered deployments. CoreOS supports Docker, which provides an 
alternative to using virtual machines. Docker instead uses containerized space to fully host 
applications that may even be built for other platforms. When combined, CoreOS and 
Docker provide SIEMonster the ability to deploy as many nodes and clusters as necessary 
so as to properly distribute the computing load across SIEMonster’s servers. SIEMonster 
can be deployed in a variety of ways including bare metal, virtual machine instances, or on 
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AWS. For a corporate deployment to a virtual AWS instance, the recommended hardware 
for each of the five servers is an eight-core CPU, 32GB of RAM, with solid-state drives 
for storage. A deployment of SIEMonster on five of these servers can monitor an enterprise 
network generating 47 million logged events per hour and can be scaled upwards as 
necessary (Rock & Bycroft, 2018). 
SEIMonster’s six primary functions are interwoven among five different servers: 
Proteus, Makara, Capricorn, Kraken, and Tiamat. The six functions include log collection, 
log processing, visualization, vulnerability detection and reporting, network user ticketing 
to report problems, and open source intelligence integration. The Makara server provides 
system management via its web application front end and serves as a centralized backup 
server for all container configuration data within SIEMonster. Each of the five servers has 
the ability to monitor their Docker containers for usage and performance. When a compute 
load imbalance exists between the servers, Makara provides system orchestration and 
moves containers between clusters to equalize resource usage (Rock & Bycroft, 2018). 
Cyber situational assessment within SIEMonster begins by collecting netflow 
traffic and logs from the network nodes and endpoints it has been directed to monitor, 
converting said traffic and logs into JSON files, and sending them to the RabbitMQ 
message queue, which takes place in the Proteus server. Makara accepts messages from 
Proteus using a Logstash indexer to parse and normalize logs prior to sending them to the 
Elastic clients for the real-time search and analytics capabilities that reside on Proteus and 
Capricorn. The last two servers, Kraken and Tiamat, are Cluster Nodes 1 and 2, 
respectively, and employ Elasticsearch to provide long-term SIEM data storage 
redundancy (Rock & Bycroft, 2018). 
Logstash is a data collection and manipulation engine, and has the ability to accept 
log input from a wide variety of sources such as TDP/UDP, files, Windows, STDIN, and 
many others. Logstash has the ability to filter and manipulate messages, which is used to 
parse and normalize log data coming into SIEMonster to ensure data uniformity. 
Logstash’s ability to output data is just as powerful as that of what it can accept. It supports 
many output options including HTTP, TCP/UDP, files, emails, and online services 
(Turnbull, 2013). 
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Elasticsearch is a distributed non-relational database, thus it has no schema or 
logical structure (Kononenko, Baysal, Holmes, & Godfrey, 2014). Elasticsearch uses an 
inverted index to store key-value pairs. In the case of SIEMonster, the key is a term from 
a JSON document and the value is a reference to the JSON document itself. The searches 
that can be performed in Elasticsearch depend on the indexes that have been generated. A 
search term has to match at least part of the beginning of a term in the index, if not the 
whole term, in order to have a successful result returned. The index most often created uses 
full words from the text of the document. Therefore, the full word index can also be used 
to find substrings that start with the beginning of the term. A second index containing the 
terms spelled backwards provides the ability to find substrings starting at the end of the 
terms. Custom indices can be created to enable searches based on the data received and the 
desired search results (Brasetvik, 2013). 
Table 2. SIEMonster v3.0: List of Open Source Software with Purpose. 
Adapted from Rock and Bycroft (2018). 
Purpose Software 
Log Retrieval Filebeat, Syslog, NXlog, OSSEC 
Process RabbitMQ, Logstash, Kustodian 
Intrusion Detection OSSEC w/ Wazuh fork 
Rules, Storage, Alerting Logstash, Elasticsearch, 411, Kustodian, OSSEC Wazuh fork 
Security Search Guard, Firewalls & Lockdowns 
Audit and Discovery Open AudIT by Opmantek 
Threat Intelligence MineMeld, opensource feed aggregation 
Visualization Kibana, Slack, Dradis IDE 
Backup scripts, Maintenance Kustodian scripted AWS Glacier backup, archive, & restore 
Vulnerability Scanning OpenVAS, Dradis IDE 
Ticketing 411/FIR Incident Response 
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c. Open Source SIEM 
Open Source SIEM (OSSIM) is a free, open source version of AlienVault’s Unified 
Security Management (USM) system (Geil, 2017), in development since 2003 
(Lkhamsuren, 2012). OSSIM has most of the security capabilities of USM, to include asset 
discover and inventory, vulnerability assessment, intrusion detection, behavioral 
monitoring, and SIEM event correlation. Support is available via AlienVault’s product 
forums (AlienVault, 2017), and it can also receive and contribute information to 
AlienVault Open Threat Exchange, which is an “open threat information sharing and 
analysis network” (AlienVault, n.d.). According to a 2015 comparison of three open source 
SIEMs, OSSIM included nine native sensors and is compatible with nearly 2000 others. It 
excelled in the categories of presentation and investigation, but has more hardware 
requirements and is more complex to configure and install than other SIEMs (Leszczyna 
& Wróbel, 2015). 
OSSIM has several limitations that discourage greater adoption of its use. The 
behavioral monitoring is not as robust as it is in USM, since OSSIM does not provide pre-
configured correlation rules. While the capability does exist, it is up to the administrator to 
create the rules, and no professional support is provided (AlienVault, 2017). Additionally, 
OSSIM does not provide functionality for log management. When used professionally, the 
installer must provide an external logging solution (kcoe, 2017a). All of these limitations 
are due to the fact that OSSIM is an open source version of AlienVault USM, and is not 
meant to be fully capable (Lkhamsuren, 2012). It has been shown that OSSIM can be 
successfully integrated with a validated forensic storage solution to overcome the lack of 
an incorporated log management solution (Afzaal, Sarno, Dantonio, & Romano, 2012). 
Though OSSIM is free to obtain, the configuration and deployment costs can be significant 
(AlienVault, 2017).  
OSSIM is designed to be deployed only as a single server, and is most appropriate 
for low-volume deployments that do not require federation (AlienVault, 2017). Though 
OSSIM may not be configured to automatically handle federation, work exists which 
documents how federation involving multiple instances of OSSIM can be accomplished 
(Aguirre & Alonso, 2012). The server installation comes with a built-in sensor package, 
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but performance will improve in a larger network that has additional sensors (AlienVault, 
2017). According to Madrid et al. (2009), OSSIM uses a distributed architecture with four 
basic elements. The first is the information capture elements, which are plugins that 
interface with network security sensors to acquire fixed observable data from the network. 
Second are the databases, which “collects all events received from the [sensors and] the 
alarms generated by the server’s correlation engine” (Madrid et al., 2009, p. 2). The third 
element is a server, which “correlates events in the database in order to detect patterns 
indicating system vulnerabilities or attacks” and additionally works to remove “most false-
positive alerts” (Madrid et al., 2009, p. 2). Finally, the fourth element is a web-based 
management console that provides a “graphical front-end to the system [which] allows 
administrator[s] to browse through reports, alarms, and statistics” (Madrid et al., 2009). 
AlienVault no longer publishes dedicated documentation for OSSIM. Many articles 
and papers that have previously referenced OSSIM documentation point to the domain 
“www.ossim.net.” This site has been removed and all documentation for OSSIM is now 
covered under USM Appliance documentation, though none of it will specifically address 
OSSIM (website: https://www.alienvault.com/documentation/usm-appliance.htm) (kcoe, 
2017b). 
Since OSSIM is a reduced version of USM, the USM Appliance documentation 
serves both SIEMs even though it only references the commercial product. A typical 
deployment of OSSIM in a professional application would be likely to occur if the size of 
the network was relatively manageable, for example, 100 assets. A deployment for this 
scenario would require only one server to host all four architectural elements. Though not 
specifically written for OSSIM, it is reasonable to assume that any hardware requirements 
for the AlienVault USM Appliance All-In-One server will apply to OSSIM as well. Table 
3 details the hardware specifications that would support a network of 150 assets with the 
following device performance: 
• 200 Million Events in Database (Maximum) 
• 1000 Events Per Second Data Collection Rate 
• 1000 Events Per Second Data Correlation Rate 
• 100 Megabits Per Second IDS Throughput (AlienVault, 2018) 
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Table 3.  OSSIM Hardware Specifications. Adapted from AlienVault 
(2018). 
Hardware Specifications 
Form Factor 1U 
Length x Width x Height (in) 26.6 x 17.2 x 1.7 
Weight (lb) 42 
Power Supply 2 x 700 / 750W 
Network Interfaces 6 x 1GbE 
CPU 2x Intel Xeon E5620 2.5GHz (8 Cores) 
Storage Capacity (TB) Compressed / Uncompressed 9.0/1.8 
Disk Array Configuration RAID 10 
Memory (GB) 24 
Redundant Power Supply Yes 
IPMI Interface Yes 
Max Heat Dissipation (BTU/hr) 2,794.54 
Max Power Consumption (kVA) 0.837 
 
C. MAPPING, AWARENESS, AND VIRTUALIZATION NETWORK 
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING TOOL 
The Mapping, Awareness, and Virtualization Network Administrator Training Tool 
(MAVNATT) provides training and evaluation to tactical network administrators. Berndt 
(2016) explains that “MAVNATT is a [lightweight] system that creates a fully partitioned, 
stateful, and virtualized instance of an operational network” (p. 5) with all of its hosts and 
components. This allows network administrators to train on the virtualized copy of their 
network, and removes network-training risks to the tactical unit’s communications. 
MAVNATT uses three different modules to accomplish this (McBride, 2015, p. 37–40). 
MAVNATT begins the virtualization process from a target network baseline, 
modeled as an open-format graph file. The Mapping Module verifies the network baseline 
by using NMAP to scan the network for element discovery, and then compares the results 
to the baseline (Collier, 2016). The Awareness Module then enhances the resulting network 
map by collecting additional details from the network elements, passing the completed map 
to the Virtualization Module. 
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Figure 4 depicts the interaction between the MAVNATT modules. Greater detail 
on the operations of the Mapping and Virtualization modules can be found in Berndt’s and 
Collier’s individual theses (Berndt, 2016; Collier, 2016). 
 
Figure 4. MAVNATT Framework. Source: McBride (2015). 
The Awareness Module, which is the focus of this work, is meant to provide 
awareness of the tactical network with regard to fault management and fault monitoring 
(McBride, 2015, p. 19). Awareness information is to be displayed to the network 
administrator via a live graph of the network’s physical topology to ensure that real-world 
faults are immediately recognized and responded to (McBride, 2015, p. 62–63). McBride 
reviewed SIEMs such as SolarWinds and OpenNMS, which he says can gain awareness of 
a network, but provide more capability then necessary for MAVNATT. McBride also notes 
that the reviewed SIEMs require more overhead than desired for MAVNATT, however, he 
concluded that “the foundation of these solutions and the open-source code can provide a 
direction that the MAVNATT awareness tool can utilize in its design” (2015, p. 23). 
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Karaarslan (2017) defined an organizational model called the Cyber Situational 
Awareness Pyramid (CSAP) to enable CSA for MAVNATT. Figure 5 depicts the CSAP 
model, which shows that CSA increases as each level of awareness is achieved. Level 1 is 
Configurational Awareness, where the network administrator acquires or maintains the 
awareness of the network’s adherence to proper configuration. Level 2 is Operational 
Awareness, in which properly configured cyber security tools are used to detect and 
eliminate or mitigate threats to the network. Level 3 is Special Conditions Awareness, 
which adds to the network administrator’s CSA by including the network user’s awareness 
of the network’s behavior (Karaarslan, 2017, p. 33–35). 
 
Figure 5. Cyber Situational Awareness Pyramid. Source: Karaarslan (2017). 
A SIEM can effectively provide the information necessary to enable a network 
administrator to achieve CSA for the first two levels of the CSAP model as those two levels 
encompass Gaicobe’s fixed observational data sources for cyber situational assessment. 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of SA and situational assessment, and discussed 
how CSA extends from SA, and what is necessary to accomplish cyber situational 
assessment. It also provided a brief overview of the principles of SIEMs and presented 
three examples of operational SIEM systems. It further provided an overview of 
MAVNATT, in particular, the Awareness Module, and Karaarslan’s CSAP model. The 
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III. AWARENESS MODULE DESIGN 
A. APPLICATION DESIGN GOALS 
This chapter describes the design objectives of the MAVNATT Awareness Module 
and provides detail of its subsystems, as well as discussions of the reasoning behind major 
design choices. From the original vision for MAVNATT, the first objective for this module 
was to “enhance a network administrator’s situational awareness by providing a 
visualization platform to display the network topology and status of network devices”; the 
second objective was to “provide a capability to overlay virtualized devices to support 
network administrator training and evaluation” (McBride, 2015, p. 60). 
The first objective requires that cyber situational assessment be provided to network 
administrators in order to facilitate their Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA). To do so, it 
is first necessary to capture and store the baseline details of the network, to include hosts, 
servers, and other equipment. Once stored, these details can be recalled as necessary for 
virtualization. Ideally, every detail about the network would be captured for virtualization 
to provide the greatest fidelity possible in training. This level of detail is necessary to 
simulate the most complex of scenarios, such as the observation of malware spreading 
through a network via email injection leading to the initial compromise of a client host, 
and ultimately a critical server. 
The second objective’s requirements parallel that of the first objective. In order to 
provide a visual overlay of virtualized devices, it is first necessary to obtain cyber 
situational assessment of the virtualized network through the collection and storage of the 
details of the virtualized devices. The details of the devices from both the physical and 
virtual networks can then be recalled and displayed to network administrators and trainers 
to provide the current cyber situational assessment of both networks. Comparison of these 
assessments of the physical and virtualized networks to the previously stored baseline 
details of the physical network will provide a way to compute the deviation of each from 
the baseline configuration, which will further enhance the cyber situational assessment 
information that can be presented to network administrators and trainers. The work 
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conducted in this thesis provides the overall plan for MAVNATT to fully meet both of the 
CSA objectives, as well as supply the Awareness Module with the ability to build the cyber 
situational assessment information from both the physical and virtual networks. 
1. MAVNATT System Design 
Through the course of this work, it became necessary to design a framework to 
support MAVNATT’s Awareness Module. The following section discusses a theoretical 
MAVNATT system design that takes into account guidance from previous work and 
experience, while drawing on an existing system as a model for MAVNATT to reference. 
System components, processes, and information flow are discussed, as well as potential 
system requirements. 
a. Guidance and Design Considerations 
The mechanical process of obtaining cyber situational assessment from a network 
can require sampling a very wide variety of sources. MAVNATT must be able to handle 
any source quickly and easily to be useful. During the design process of the Awareness 
Module, it was useful to theorize a potential system construct that would fit MAVNATT’s 
original intent, while supporting the module’s design objectives. This was used to provide 
a check on the practicality of the system. This thesis assumes that MAVNATT will be used 
on tactical networks per the original system concept, which stated that the system should 
be “simple, lightweight, responsive, and resilient so it can operate across the spectrum of 
operations and in highly dynamic environments, specifically targeting the portion of the 
operational network under the oversight and operation of those being trained or evaluated” 
(McBride, 2015, p. 2). 
The author of this thesis has four years’ experience on afloat naval platforms and 
has become familiar with the environmental constraints of tactical networks during that 
time. That experience suggests that MAVNATT’s system design must consist of a single 
portable server containing the functionality of all three modules, as well as all of the 
required supporting software and hardware. A single server construct is optimal because 
the space and resources required to host additional equipment beyond the unit’s original 
requirements is assumed to be prohibitive on many tactical platforms. 
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To stay within the single server construct, MAVNATT must not be expected to host 
the virtualization space due to its portability requirement. This space could alternatively be 
provided by temporary virtualization resources or by the tactical unit’s inherent storage 
infrastructure. One system that has been deployed with this capability is the Navy’s 
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprises Services (CANES) system, which employs 
virtualization and cloud technologies (Anderson, 2014). For all but very small networks, 
full-scale network virtualization is not required nor efficient for effective network training. 
It is reasonable to expect that effective training will only require virtualization of the more 
crucial aspects of the network and it is possible that tactical units will have sufficient excess 
resources to accommodate such training. 
b. Design Example: OSSIM 
Of the SIEMs reviewed in Chapter II, OSSIM is a good example of what the 
MAVNATT server could be like. The OSSIM platform can be deployed as a single server 
and uses Debian Linux (Jessie 8) as its operating system. It contains many of the functions 
needed to produce cyber situational assessment, such as network discovery, vulnerability 
scanning, and monitoring. Network discovery has yet to be built into the Mapping Module, 
and using OSSIM as a guide has the potential to save a great deal of research effort. Neither 
OSSIM nor the Mapping Module has a way to automatically detect and document a 
network topology at this time, but OSSIM does conduct automated endpoint detection. 
OSSIM employs a web-based user interface (WUI) which provides access to nearly 
all of its functionality. Much of the user accessible information that OSSIM contains, 
including its WUI configuration and the details of the devices it has been tasked to monitor, 
is stored within OSSIM’s MySQL database schema. This design choice allows OSSIM to 
maintain the fastest possible access to WUI elements and network details with high 
referential integrity because the database is maintained in the server’s memory. This aspect 
of OSSIM’s design serves as an excellent example for future MAVNATT development. 
It is important to remember that OSSIM is the open source offering of AlienVault’s 
USM, which is a commercial product and can change from version to version. While 
OSSIM offers a great deal of the features that MAVNATT needs, including a functional 
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WUI that could be adapted to host MAVNATT, it is not a reliable platform on which to 
build MAVNATT. While researching this work, OSSIM’s file system and schema were 
not openly published and should not be relied upon to remain stable. Any changes 
AlienVault chooses to make to OSSIM’s file system or schema will take place without 
warning and an update to either could cause MAVNATT’s WUI to malfunction or 
completely break. 
 
Figure 6. Theoretical MAVNATT System Design. 
c. MAVNATT System: Cyber Situational Assessment Initialization Process 
Overview 
To create cyber situational assessment, MAVNATT must gather information about 
the physical network to be virtualized. MAVNATT will accomplish this by utilizing a 
collection of tools, including the functions of the Mapping Module. All of these tools 
(Figure 6, block 4) will be accessible to the user through a WUI. The WUI (Figure 6, block 
1) will require a webserver and may use a Java servlet container to provide enhanced 
controls to the user. The webserver would also allow access to the Virtualization and 
Awareness Modules, along with an Input/Output Module. The purpose of the Input/Output 
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Module is to parse, convert, and transfer the network baseline information of a Graph 
Markup Language (GraphML) file into and out of the MAVNATT system. 
To capture the network configuration information, scripts and logging agents 
(Figure 6, block 2) can be deployed to each network component to forward the information 
as required. This information will be directed to the active logging port on MAVNATT. 
This port, as well as the passive listening port, will be attached to a network namespace 
container (Figure 6, block 3). This ensures that network collisions do not occur when 
MAVNATT is also connected to a virtual network that is logically equivalent to the 
physical network. File descriptors can be used to connect to network namespaces 
(Biederman, 2013). Many tools can interface with file descriptors to collect information, 
but it is likely that some will not have that capability. It may be necessary to install tools 
that cannot use file descriptors into a software container that natively uses file descriptors 
to interface with the network stack. Such containers, like the Docker solution used by 
SEIMonster, create “a container in the containers own network namespace” and would 
solve this problem (Sriraman, 2017, para. 2). 
The network configuration information now moves from the collection tool to a 
data normalization process (Figure 6, block 5) that will parse through and reformat the 
information received according to a set of rules to convert it into a uniform format. The 
output will be pushed to a non-schema database for storage. The Awareness Module can 
then query this database using an IP address that correlates to a network component to 
obtain its baseline information. When the Awareness Module has collected all of the 
required information related to an IP address, that information, along with any network 
topology data, will be written to the Physical Data Set database within a relational database 
management system (RDBMS) (Figure 6, block 6). Once the information in the Physical 
Data Set is complete, that data set will be copied to a second database in the RDBMS to 
serve as the Baseline Data Set. The Awareness Module will then call the Virtualization 
Module with the required Baseline data set information to create a virtualized network 
(Figure 6, block 7). After the virtualization process is complete, scripts and logging agents 
will be installed to the virtualized network, which will connect to MAVNATT via a 
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separate network namespace (Figure 6, block 3), and then begin pushing virtualized 
network configuration information into the system. 
d. RDBMS Overview 
While only one copy of the detailed network configuration is required to determine 
that a change has been made to the system, the RDBMS (Figure 6, block 6) contains three 
separate schemas to allow the Awareness Module to track the differences between: 
• the Physical Database and the Baseline Database; 
• the Virtual Database and the Baseline Database; 
• the current state of the physical network from the Physical Database; and 
• the current state of the virtual network from the Virtual Database. 
To accomplish this, the three databases that the RDBMS contains are: 
• the Physical Database, which contains the physical network configuration 
baseline; 
• the Baseline Database, which contains the network configuration baseline; and 
• the Virtual Database, which contains the virtualized network configuration 
baseline. 
All three schemas should accommodate the network configuration details from the 
Physical Database so they may be copied to the Baseline Database and then to the Virtual 
Database as required. Each schema may contain some tables or fields that are specific to 
itself, but the tables and fields for all tracked details should be identical for ease of 
comparison. An indirect comparison of fields may be required if the physical and virtual 
details are different, which would require an equivalency matrix for the proper comparison 
of the details. The information that needs to be tracked includes such details as the device’s 
network identifier, host name, operating system, the amount of RAM installed, and the 
speed and number of processors onboard. Additionally, the detailed software configuration 
must be stored, such as the operating system version and any installed updates for the 
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applications on the tracked device. The schema must also store the network topological 
information. 
e. MAVNATT Hardware Requirements 
The hardware requirements for the MAVNATT server will generally depend on the 
number of tools running and the system overhead involved, but they must include a 
minimum of five physical Ethernet ports to achieve simultaneous monitoring of both the 
physical and virtual networks, and provide user access to the server. Three port groupings 
would be created (Figure 6, block 3): 
• Two ports dedicated to Physical Network monitoring (eth0 & eth1) 
• Two ports dedicated to Virtual Network monitoring (eth2 & eth3) 
• One port dedicated to external system access (eth4) 
 
Figure 7. MAVNATT Incremental Design—OSSIM Build. 
2. MAVNATT Incremental System Build 
It was not possible to implement the proposed system above as part of this thesis 
due to the extensive amount of development required to achieve it. In support of the future 
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development of MAVNATT’s Awareness Module, the critical database schema was built 
and its implementation is detailed in Chapter IV to show that creating CSA for MAVNATT 
is possible. Since an initial system build was not possible, OSSIM was used as an 
intermediate platform to support schema development. 
There were several advantages to using OSSIM as the intermediate platform. The 
first is that OSSIM can approximate the computational loading of the potential MAVNATT 
system build, making it a convenient platform for testing. This is important as it is unknown 
if all of the proposed software components for MAVNATT can run simultaneously on a 
single machine. OSSIM uses many of the same software components MAVNATT could 
be expected to use. These components include MySQL (Figure 7, block 1), Apache web 
server (Figure 7, block 2), and Debian Linux operating system. OSSIM’s tool set (Figure 
7, block 3), which includes NMAP for network discovery, OpenVAS for vulnerability 
detection, and Nagios for network monitoring, could all be incorporated into MAVNATT’s 
tool set to provide cyber situational assessment. OSSIM has no log storage solution, but it 
does have the RabbitMQ message broker preinstalled, which would support a logging 
solution. By adding logging software to OSSIM, it is possible to observe whether a single 
server could support the MAVNATT system as designed.  
An additional advantage is that using OSSIM’s preinstalled software suite should 
greatly reduce the incremental build time for testing purposes. One such software package 
that may provide log data to the Awareness Module without a large investment of time is 
OSSEC, a host-based intrusion detection system that is often used as a log analysis tool 
and can be used for log normalization. OSSEC includes a host-based agent for the 
Windows operating system that forwards generated logs to a server running the OSSEC 
service. Linux/Unix systems already have this capability built-in. Logs are often sent as 
plain text files and use a format similar to syslog (OSSEC, n.d.) 
To collect the host operating system details, a script or application specific to the 
host operating system can be used to poll and collect the required information and write it 
to a log file (Figure 7, block 4). This log can then be passed to the OSSEC agent or syslog 
process for transmission to the OSSEC server on OSSIM for processing. Upon receipt of 
a log, the activity is checked against a ruleset and then processed accordingly (OSSEC, 
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n.d.). The ruleset is a custom decoder; an XML file that can be written to recognize and 
parse specific log data. The ossec-analysisd process conducts analysis of a log according 
to the decoder file, which becomes part of the data normalization process (Figure 7, block 
5). As noted in Chapter II, Logstash conducts data normalization as well and is an 
additional candidate to fill this role. Once normalized, the data would be pushed to a log 
storage solution and be made available to the Awareness Module (Figure 7, block 6). Once 
the required information was obtained from the log storage solution and further refined, 
the Awareness Module would then populate the relational database with the newly acquired 
network configuration details. 
Another installed software package within OSSIM that is of immediate use to the 
work of this thesis is MySQL version 6.3 (Figure 7, block 1), a relational database system. 
OSSIM’s MySQL database requires modification in order to support the storage of all of 
the necessary configuration details of the network. The details that OSSIM tracks are only 
a small subset of the information required to accurately virtualize a physical device. This 
subset is really just the device’s network identifiers, host name, and operating system. 
While the details that OSSIM gathers are useful, it is not worth the effort to reutilize them. 
To take advantage of them, one would have to know exactly where they are stored with 
OSSIM’s database to query them. OSSIM’s database is complex and subject to change 
upon the release of a new version. Using Oracle’s SQL Developer, it was discovered that 
the database contains 11 schemas with a total of 347 tables. Several of these schemas are 
used to provide setup information and store SQL functions or procedures. These schemas 
are heavily interconnected, which means that querying the data may require several 
complex table JOIN operations in order to obtain the correct data. 
It is possible to append the tables currently within the database to store the 
virtualization and topological data, but as previously discussed, this is risky because those 
tables may change in later releases of OSSIM, which would cause stability issues for 
OSSIM as well as MAVNATT. Due to this potential for problems, new schemas within 
OSSIM’s relational database that are tailored specifically to serve each of the three data 
sets independently were constructed. For this work, having dedicated schemas will allow 
the data sets to reference OSSIM’s schema or even update it if later desired. This would 
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allow for the device network identifier, host name, and operating system details within 
OSSIM’s schema to match the information within the Awareness Module. 
The latest version of MySQL, version 8, supports both relational and non-relational 
database architectures, which gives the potential to optimize the MAVNATT system 
design by negating the need for two separate database packages (Oracle, 2019). As 
designed, MAVNATT currently requires relational and non-relational databases. The first 
is required to maintain normalized, schema-based information, which is accessed via 
structured query language (SQL), while the second is necessary to store logged information 
in documents that support a schema-less architecture. Jatana, Puri, Ahuja, Kathuria, & 
Gosain (2012) note that the advantage of using a non-relational database system to store 
logs is that it has higher data throughput than relational database systems, allowing it to 
keep up with incoming logging information more easily. 
Finally, OSSIM uses Debian Linux version 8, codenamed Jessie, which carries 
several advantages of its own. First, its stability and reliability surpass most Linux builds 
due to its comprehensive package interaction policy, making it very dependable. Debian is 
thought to support at least 40,000 different software packages (Byfield, 2017), which 
means there is a good chance MAVNATT can have the functionality it requires at zero 
cost. Debian itself is also free to use, further keeping development cost to a minimum. 
3. MAVNATT Awareness Module Design 
The following sub-sections discuss in detail the different components, interfaces, 
and processes of the proposed MAVNATT Awareness Module Design, as referred to in 




Figure 8. Awareness Module Design. 
a. Database Interface 
The Database Interface (Figure 8, block 1) provides communications between the 
Awareness Module and the databases within the MAVNATT system. The interface can 
accept a string that contains a command to transmit and a destination for the transmission. 
It will then send the command to the proper communication handler to fulfill the request. 
The interface will accept the returned result of the command from the database into 
memory and then return that value to the calling function. It will not perform any error 
checking of the command to be sent, or of the data that is returned. 
b. Mapping Module Interface 
The Mapping Module Interface (Figure 8, block 2) passes GraphML files between 
the Mapping and Awareness Modules. When called to accept a GraphML file to send to 
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the Awareness Module Operations Manager, the interface will accept a string that is 
expected to be a GraphML file path. If the file path is valid and the file is of the expected 
type, it will be passed to the Operations Manager for parsing and inclusion in the proper 
data set within the relational database. When called to send a file to the Mapping Module 
from the Operations Manager, the interface will accept a string that is expected to be a 
GraphML file path. If the file path is valid and the file is of the expected type, it will then 
be passed to the Mapping Module in order to update and refresh the Mapping Module’s 
visual network map. 
c. Virtualization Module Interface 
The Virtualization Module Interface (Figure 8, block 3) passes GraphML files from 
the Awareness Module to the Virtualization Module. Like the Mapping Module Interface, 
this interface will accept a string that is expected to be a GraphML file path. If the file path 
is valid and the file is of the expected type, it will then be passed to the Virtualization 
Module to facilitate the virtualization process. 
d. Operations Manager 
The purpose of the Awareness Module Operations Manager (Figure 8, block 4) is 
to oversee the parsing of JSON and GraphML documents, and the compilation of GraphML 
files, and to manage the Baseline Data Set database within the relational databases. In 
addition to its own functions, the Operations Manager contains three methods to assist in 
formatting and moving data between the other modules and the databases: 
(1) File Parser 
This method is responsible for parsing incoming JSON and GraphML documents 
to the Operations Manager. Any document that is parsed is expected to have its information 
sent to the relational database for storage, including all of its visualization details. To 
accomplish this, the File Parser selects and converts the pertinent information in the 
incoming GraphML file into a list that will be returned to the Operations Manager. 
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(2) SQL Requestor 
This method is responsible for formatting data into SQL commands for the 
Operations Manager. It accepts a list that contains a destination within the relational 
database, a command, and values that it formats into a proper SQL command. It then sends 
the command to the proper data set via the Database Interface. The result received from 
this operation is returned to the Operations Manager. 
(3) File Builder 
This method is responsible for building GraphML files upon receipt of a data source 
and a list of primary keys. The File Builder will then iterate through primary keys, sending 
a QUERY command to the SQL Requestor for the information related to the primary key. 
Upon receipt of a successful request from the SQL Requestor, it will format the data 
received and append to the GraphML file. When the process is complete, the final file is 
returned to the Operations Manager. 
In addition, the following are activities that the Operations Manager must perform: 
(1) Process Incoming GraphML File 
Any GraphML file that the Operations Manager receives from the Mapping Module 
is meant to be inserted into the relational database. Prior to insertion, it will ensure that the 
user wants to proceed, as this action will permanently modify the database before 
proceeding with parsing. As each device in the GraphML file is parsed and returned to the 
Operations Manager, it will immediately be sent to the SQL Requestor for entry into the 
Baseline Data Set. In the event that the SQL Requestor replies that the entry already exists, 
the data will be resent as an update to the database. The Operations Manager will inform 
the user that the operation has completed when the GraphML file is completely parsed. 
(2) Purge Database 
The user can request to purge the relational database of all device entries through 
the Operations Manager, which in turn will send SELECT and DELETE commands to the 
SQL Requestor. The SQL Requestor will return the number of entries that were 
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successfully deleted to the Operations Manager; this information will also be displayed to 
the user. 
(3) Create Network Baseline 
When the network administrator believes that enough details have been collected 
about the network, he can direct the Operations Manager to create the Network Baseline 
Data Set. The Operations Manager will accomplish this task with several SQL commands, 
all of which will go through the SQL Requestor and Database Interface.  
First, if a Network Baseline Data Set does not already exist, the Operations 
Manager will create a new database within the relational server capable of storing all of the 
details necessary to create the Network Baseline Data Set. After the Data Set is created or 
verified, the Operations Manager will QUERY the relational database to get a full list of 
primary keys of all of the equipment within the Physical Data Set. Upon receiving the 
returned list of values, the Operations Manager will iterate through each primary key and 
transmit an SQL command to copy all of the details associated with that primary key to the 
new database. Upon completion, the Operations Manager will return the number of primary 
keys returned from the Physical Data Set and the number of devices written to the Network 
Baseline Data Set. 
(4) Create GraphML File 
To create a specific GraphML file using one of the three previously discussed data 
sets, the Operations Manager issues a SQL command via the SQL Requestor to QUERY 
the relevant OSSIM MySQL database for a full list of primary keys of all of the equipment 
within that data set. If the SQL command completes successfully, the Operations Manager 
then sends it the returned list of primary keys and the source database location to the File 
Builder, which returns a GraphML file. Upon receiving the GraphML file, the Operations 
Manager then returns that file to the calling process. 
(5) Create Virtual Network Data Set 
The creation of the Virtual Network Data Set follows the virtualization of the 
physical network, which is accomplished by exporting the Network Baseline Data Set to 
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the Virtualization Module via a GraphML file. Once the Virtualization Module has 
completed the virtualization process, the Operations Manager will then populate the 
relational database with the information from the Network Baseline Data Set in a way that 
is analogous to the method used to create the Physical Network Data Set. This will assist 
in verifying the virtualization process as well as initialize cyber situational assessment for 
the virtualized network. 
e. Difference and Visualization Engine 
The purpose of the Difference and Visualization Engine (Figure 8, block 5) is to 
display the differences between the Physical Network Data Set, the Network Baseline Data 
Set, and the Virtual Network Data Set by calculating the deviation of the Physical and 
Virtual Networks from the Network Baseline. The Engine is expected to be controlled by 
the user and request information from the Operations Manager when a timer event takes 
place, which could be set to occur once or to repeat many times. It is also expected that the 
Engine work through the Operations Manager to access the data sets within the relational 
database. The Engine could do this in two ways.  
The first method is by requesting an XML file of an entire data set, which could 
result in a large file depending on the size of the network and the amount of details required 
for it. A simpler method would be to request the details for a single network node across 
all three data sets, compute the differences from the baseline, and then store the result. The 
visualization of the network could then be updated after the result is stored, depending on 
the method used to present the visualization. Storage of calculated results within the 
relational database would enable fast updating of the visualization since the RDBMS is 
maintained in active memory. 
Although the Difference and Visualization Engine is an internal component of the 
Awareness Module, its design was beyond the scope of this work. During the design 
process of the Awareness Module, it was useful to theorize how the Engine might work in 
order to develop the requirements for the Engine within the Awareness Module. This is left 
for future work on the full implementation of the MAVNATT Awareness Module. 
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f. Awareness Visualization Scheme 
Earlier Mapping Module work used a node-link diagram with icons to display a 
representation of the network map. Color changes on links and nodes were used to 
represent differences in the network topology baseline from a network scan conducted after 
the baseline was taken (Collier, 2016, p. 29). It is recommended that the visualization 
scheme be enhanced to enable it to display the highly detailed information that MAVNATT 
is capable of attaining due to the Awareness Module designed in this work. The tiered 
network display in the earlier work is good for visual verification of a network topology, 
but can make it difficult to view the network in its entirety when it scales to very large size. 
To mitigate this, the visualization scheme should also include a node-link diagram capable 
of condensing the network view by reducing the network nodes to points vice icons and 
using a radial or star display of the edges around nodes with multiple links. 
As changes take place on the network, network nodes can change from points back 
to icons and then be colored according to the Mapping Module’s original visualization 
scheme to bring attention to the change. However, changing colors alone cannot convey 
the degree to which a change has taken place. For example, changes to a node’s software 
configuration is not accounted for within the Mapping Module’s original scheme. A 
percentage of the amount of details within the software configuration that have deviated 
from the configuration baseline can be derived from the information within the Awareness 
Module. This result can then be used to vary the size the network node’s icon on the display 
to show the intensity of the change in the node. 
The visualization scheme should also provide the ability to display any data set 
within the Awareness Module separately or layer data sets together to display a single map. 
Since there are three data sets (the physical, baseline, and virtual data sets), each could be 
assigned a default primary color (blue, yellow, or red). The addition of a data set to the 
display would change the color output of the map. For example, if all three data sets were 
displayed, the resulting color of the map would be white. If just the Physical and Network 
Data Sets were displayed, the color of the map would be green. Any network map display 
used should be interactive and display the details of the node that are known (or unknown) 
to the system by allowing the user to click on any available node for more information. 
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g. Proposed Scheme of Numerical Difference Calculation 
Displaying the total difference from one data set to another within the network map 
can be difficult to visualize. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are many aspects 
of cyber situational assessment that can be quantified. The aspects chosen are often 
dependent upon the network deployment. To provide a gauge as to how much a particular 
aspect of the network has changed, deviations can be measured by computing the 
percentage of change from the original value. For example, a network administrator may 
want to measure the change in number of devices on the physical network against the 
baseline network configuration. Any number of desired network aspects could be assigned 
a percentage value based upon criteria or preference. When added together, their total 
results would provide a single numerical representation of the amount of deviation in a data 
set from the baseline configuration. 
B. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a detailed overview of a proposed new construct for the 
MAVNATT system, and provided an overview of an incremental MAVNATT build using 
OSSIM as an intermediate platform. It also provided an overview of a proposed 
MAVNATT Awareness Module, including its functions and internal processes. The next 
chapter will describe the implementation of the physical, baseline, and virtual schemas, 
which will provide the Awareness Module with supporting informational framework to 
enable cyber situational assessment. 
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IV. MAVNATT RELATIONAL SCHEMA IMPLEMENTATION 
A. SCHEMA ATTRIBUTE SELECTION REASONING 
The main objective of MAVNATT is to allow network administrators to train on 
an accurate virtual model of their own network without affecting the network operation. 
The Awareness Module within MAVNATT is designed to provide an awareness or status 
of both the physical and virtual networks to enable fault and network difference detection 
(McBride, 2015 p. 7, 19, 39, 62).  
One of the most important aspects of military training is to “train as you fight,” 
meaning that the trainee must train with the same systems and processes they would use in 
combat. The primary reason for this is to gain system familiarization while learning the 
required processes and functions of that particular system. In the case of computer network 
training, the aspects of a physical network that should be virtualized, and therefore the 
aspects that need to be recorded and tracked, are dependent upon the objectives of the 
training the administrator is undergoing. The more accurate the virtualization of the 
network, the more accurate the training environment. 
To produce such an environment, the virtualized network should be logically and 
numerically equivalent to the physical network. Logical equivalency can be achieved by 
ensuring each node of the virtualized network has the same processes and connections as 
the physical network, to include having the same networking device connections, open 
network ports, software processes connected to those open ports, media access control 
(MAC) addresses, Internet protocol (IP) addresses, and so on. Numerical equivalency is 
the amount of a particular resource that has been allocated to a physical node as well as to 
the virtual representation of that node. Numerical equivalency should be considered less 
important than logical equivalency since resource allocation determines how much of a 
load a node can handle. For example, a large email server may need a great deal of 
processing, memory, and storage space to function efficiently. However, that server may 
not need as many resources when virtualized to accomplish a network training objective. 
Quantities of attributes such as CPU cores, allocated memory, allocated video memory, 
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etc., will be collected for each node and then be referenced to create a virtualized node that 
can properly accommodate the training objectives to be achieved. 
The minimum set of attributes that MAVNATT must keep track of are those 
maintained in the GraphML file used between the Mapping and Virtualization Modules. 
These attributes include an image of the node, which may be all that is needed to meet the 
required training objective. In the event that a GraphML file is unavailable, MAVNATT 
needs to compile the logical and numerical system attributes that contribute the most to 
meeting network administrator training objectives efficiently with regard to virtualization 
time and resources. 
The initial attribute list created for this work was based on those attributes 
considered to the have the greatest impact in creating a virtual representation of a physical 
network with enough accuracy to meet a majority of the training objectives for network 
administrators. Logical and numerical attributes that VirtualBox can implement or adjust 
that provided this impact were identified and included in the schema described below. 
Having these attributes in advance of the virtualization process will also reduce the time to 
implement that process since VirtualBox’s API allows them to be done programmatically 
vice implementing them manually. A few additional attributes that have little impact on 
training objectives, such as device manufacturer and device model, were also added to 
assist with troubleshooting. 
B. SCHEMA ATTRIBUTE MATRIX 
The Attribute Matrix (Appendix A) contains a list and description of the 65 selected 
logical, numerical, and informational attributes deemed most useful toward building a 
faithful representation of the network for the system admin training. A description of the 
columns follows: 
Attribute Matrix: Column Name and Descriptions 
A# - Attribute Number: provides an index for table and field references in the 
schema description. 
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Employed Upon/After Creation: Denotes if the attribute can be included into the 
VM upon or after its creation. 
Expected Training Impact: Assigns an expected training impact to the virtualization 
attribute. 
• High – Will have a serious impact on the accuracy of the training because 
it is a logical attribute of the physical network. 
• Medium – May have a noticeable impact on the smoothness of the training 
depending upon the amount of resources (numerical attribute) required to 
replicate the services within the virtual network environment. 
• Low – Any details in this category are mostly for organization and 
management of the virtualization and could have an impact on the training 
if left out. 
• None – These are details which have minimal to no effect on the accuracy 
of the virtualization because they are physical node metadata or data points 
which cannot be virtualized at this time. 
Manual Section / Page#: Section and page number within the VirtualBox Manual 
where the attribute was found. 
Attribute Type: Denotes the attribute type. 
• Logical Attribute – A discrete value or specific setting for a component of 
a node.  
• Numerical Attribute – A quantitative value that describes the resource 
allocation for a component of a node. 
• Informational Attribute – Metadata for a component of a node. 
Component Category: Denotes if the detail belongs to a node’s hardware or 
software. This is an important aspect of virtualization, as highly accurate hardware 
emulation can be difficult to achieve (Kuchera, 2011). In the event that it is necessary to 
virtualize specialized equipment, the difference in accuracy between the physical and 
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virtualized node may be something that could affect the accuracy of training taking place 
and should be noted by the trainer. 
Component Type: Denotes the computer hardware or software category the detail 
generally relates to. 
Component Description: Specific description of the detail. 
VirtualBox Command: VirtualBox command used to implement the detail. 
VirtualBox Command Attributes: Detail of the attributes for the VirtualBox 
command, if available. Shaded cells represent information that is expected to not directly 
translate between the physical and virtual databases due to VirtualBox hardware emulation 
options. 
C. SCHEMA DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Three criteria were taken into consideration during the design of the schema. The 
first is that the designed schema should be implemented as a universal solution for the 
physical, baseline, and virtual databases to enable direct comparisons between each. To 
make this possible, the baseline database includes a variation in its schema that allows for 
a logical transition between all three databases. This variation is the addition of a single 
field, where necessary, to each of the baseline database’s look up tables to track the 
translation between the attribute on the physical node and the VirtualBox option chosen to 
emulate that attribute. The identified tables that required this modification are hardware 
related, yet this could be applied to any look up table where a direct comparison is not 
possible. To reduce any confusion between direct comparisons of the databases, 
VirtualBox categories and terminology were used to group and name attributes as much as 
possible. Most grouping within the schema was based upon the Attribute Matrix’s category 
and component columns, which were derived from the VirtualBox manual and experience. 
The second consideration was that the schema should provide for the enforcement 
of virtualization limits, to the extent practical. VirtualBox was noted to have several 
limitations in the number of network interface cards, serial ports, and other interfaces that 
it can support. Additionally, all of the devices still had to have unique settings to prevent 
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conflicts, just as any physical computer would have as well. To ensure that the schema was 
able to support unique combinations of virtualized equipment with a node, junction and 
lookup tables were employed to provide referential integrity while enforcing unique 
constraints on equipment settings where necessary. This also assists in the virtualization of 
the node since the lookup tables only contain the options that are available to the commands 
within VirtualBox. As VirtualBox changes, the options within these tables will have to be 
updated. Physical nodes may not have the same constraints as what VirtualBox can 
virtualize, so only the virtual database is expected to use prepopulated lookup tables, which 
will limit how many or what kind of selection can be made for a database entry. 
The final consideration was the optimization of the database’s memory usage 
through the reduction of redundant data by reusing entries as many times as possible. This 
was accomplished through the use of lookup tables and unique constraints on row entries 
for those tables. 
D. MAVNATT SCHEMA DESIGN DIAGRAM 
The schema design, based on the logical grouping of attributes with regard to the 
design considerations, is shown in Appendix B. The schema design is for all three 
databases, with the extra tables and fields for the baseline database highlighted in blue. The 
design elements include data and table types as follows: 
1. Data Types 
The data types selected for each field were dependent upon the amount of data that 
the field was expected to contain, based on a 1,000-node network. The data limitations can 
be adjusted higher to allow greater capacity if necessary. The following data types were 
used: 
• TINYINT UNSIGNED: An unsigned integer type that ranges from 0 to 255. 
• SMALLINT UNSIGNED: An unsigned integer type that ranges from 0 to 
65535. 
• MEDUIMINT UNSIGNED: An unsigned integer type that ranges from 0 
to 16777215. 
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• VARCHAR(M): Variable-length string with length M. Most fields in the 
tables are expected to contain no more than 16 characters. These limits were 
exercised to make the database more space efficient and the size 
expectations were derived from the VirtualBox manual and the attributes 
that can be assigned to commands. String lengths that are not of 16 are 
documented in the table description as to what it is expected to contain. All 
string lengths are to be considered initial values that have not been tested 
and should be changed as required. 
2. Table Types 
Many of the tables in the schema have a parent-child relationship to create reference 
tables that can be used by other tables to lookup specific data thru JOIN operations. In the 
case of the virtual database, the tables that contain prepopulated entries are intended to 
restrict attribute detail selection options to a specific set while reducing redundant 
information entries in the database. 
In addition to the above lookup tables, junction tables were also used in the schema 
as a way of assigning a specific configuration set to a device or to the node itself. This was 
accomplished through the use of two fields within the table that hold foreign keys, each of 
which referenced the unique primary key of another table. A primary key constraint is then 
placed on the combination of the two foreign keys to ensure that its entry in the table is 
unique. This process ensures that the device or configuration cannot be assigned to any 
other node or device. 
3. Schema Redundancy 
The node’s IP address is duplicated within the schema in both the topology table 
and the NIC Configuration tables. This is done to account for the case where the topology 
does not exist for a node; thus, the IP address must still be recorded in the NIC 
Configuration table. This is especially important if the distant node is outside of the 
virtualized network. 
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E. SCHEMA TABLE AND FIELD DESCRIPTIONS 
A detailed description of the schema tables, to include their fields and relationships, 
is provided in Appendix C. The description seeks to clarify the logical structure of the 
schema, as well as how it employs unique constraints to enforce virtualization limitations. 
The table field descriptions include the field’s data-type, reasoning for that data-type if 
necessary, and a brief description of what the field contains. Some of the fields are linked 
to the Attribute Matrix (Appendix A) through the use of the attribute number (A#), which 
can be found immediately after the bold text field name. Much of the schema description 
is written with regard to how it will be employed as the Virtual Database as this is the most 
restrictive use case. Any difference within the schema’s look up tables is noted within the 
description.  
F. MAVNATT SCHEMA SQL CODE 
The schema build code and the virtual database lookup table population code is 
provided in Appendix D. Oracle’s SQL Developer v18 was the environment used to build 
the code, which was tested on OSSIM v5.5 with MySQL v6.3 installed. The resulting 
database was then analyzed to ensure table connections were accurately generated. This 
was accomplished via Oracle’s SQL Developer Data Modeler function by importing the 
baseline database’s Data Dictionary and viewing the resulting relational table map 
(Appendix E).  
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a detailed discussion of the design and implementation of a 
relational database system used to provide the MAVNATT Awareness Module with a way 
to create cyber situational assessment of a network via the recording of its logical and 
numerical attributes. It discussed node attribute selection, design considerations, and the 
overall SQL development solution. The next chapter assesses how effectively this RDBS 
system implementation meets the system requirements of MAVNATT and discusses future 
work to further these research efforts. 
 48 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 49 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. OVERVIEW 
This research has defined a conceptual model of a top-down system to virtualize a 
computer network through the cyber situational assessment of that network for the purpose 
of training network administrators. To help create a faithful virtualized representation of 
the network, we propose a collection of logical and numerical attributes that can be used 
to create the virtualized network. The models and processes discussed within this work 
expand what can be expected from the original MAVNATT conceptual model. The chapter 
details the conclusions resulting from the research and then focuses on future research 
needs to finalize the Awareness Module and a full MAVNATT build. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The research objective for this work was to determine how situational awareness 
could be generated for MAVNATT. The development of the conceptual designs for 
MAVNATT’s Awareness Module drove the selection of attributes of network nodes, 
which led to the realization of the need to employ a data structure capable of managing and 
tracking nodal network attributes in an efficient manner. To this end, a relational schema 
was used to manage and track the multitude of attributes necessary to enable the generation 
of cyber situational assessment. 
1. Research Objectives 
There were two main objectives for this work. The first objective was to find an 
efficient method to provide the tactical network administrator with Cyber Situational 
Awareness (CSA). The background research noted that it is only possible to provide CSA 
through cyber situational assessment, since CSA is a cognitive process. To provide cyber 
situational assessment, this work instead offers a conceptual system of several tools and 
their information flows to collect, normalize, and store incoming data. This processing of 
information actually applies to the Mapping Module and expands what the module should 
be considered to do. Instead of just mapping the topology of the network, the Mapping 
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Module should also examine each node to identify and capture the details of its baseline 
configuration. These details can be captured as a set of attributes that are then organized in 
a relational database. Once organized, this data becomes available for consumption by the 
Awareness Module to enable cyber situational assessment. 
The second research objective was to implement the module for MAVNATT that 
provides baseline configurational awareness to the network administrator. This objective 
was not accomplished because it was discovered that the amount of effort necessary to 
design and implement a fully functional Awareness Module was far greater than 
anticipated for a single M.Sc. thesis. However, by providing a conceptual design for the 
Awareness Module with a supporting MAVNATT system design concept, initial 
construction and testing of both the MAVNATT system and the Awareness Module can 
now take place. The designed and implemented relational schema provides a blueprint to 
provide cyber situational assessment via the management and tracking of the desired 
network attributes. 
2. Research Questions 
Primary question: How is the CSA of a tactical network achieved? 
Conclusion: The CSA of a tactical network is achieved via the collection, normalization, 
and recording of network attributes. The software tools required to process the attributes 
include host agents to collect and send the required information; a logging system to 
receive and parse the information from the host agents and passive netflow collection; 
normalization processes for the received attributes; and an indexed storage system by 
which the attributes can be retrieved. The attributes may require additional processing prior 
to presentation to the user, such as management and tracking of the attribute, or comparison 
with a previously recorded state. The finalized data attributes are then presented in a clear 
and concise way that efficiently relays the available information to the user, creating cyber 
situational assessment.  
Secondary question: What kind of information needs to be collected, and how should it 
be analyzed and visualized to produce effective CSA? 
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Conclusion: The kind of information to be collected, how it is analyzed, and how it is 
displayed all depend on the aspect of the network which the user wishes to produce for 
effective cyber situational assessment. MAVNATT’s goal is tactical network administrator 
training. To produce cyber situational assessment in support of that goal means gathering 
the baseline configuration of all of the nodes of the network to be virtualized. This enables 
the trainees and trainers to see the difference between the physical network and the virtual 
network when compared to the baseline. This baseline configuration includes each node’s 
hardware specifications, network configuration, operating system configuration, and user 
settings. 
Tactical network administrator training could also require network security aspects 
as well. This would require collecting the network security attributes, which the 
implemented schema does not fully support. It is important to emphasize that the relational 
schema produced by this work can and should be further extended and refined. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Since this work focused on the design of the MAVNATT system and the Awareness 
Module, the implementation and testing of those designs are certainly opportunities for 
future work. However, there are many other opportunities to refine and improve this work 
beyond system implementation and testing. There is much research left to be done in order 
to fully support the training aspect of MAVNATT. 
1. Configuration Baseline Research 
This work compiled many of the configuration baseline attributes that VirtualBox 
can virtualize; however, the list of attributes is not final. Most of the compiled attributes 
are hardware-based and only a few operating system details are captured by our relational 
schema. A survey of tactical network administrator training goals and the attributes 
required to meet those goals needs to be conducted in order to validate the configuration 
baseline attributes that the implemented schema focuses on. This will determine the 
comprehensive set of attributes that should be collected and tracked with regard to the 
tactical network administrator training that MAVNATT is meant to support. 
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2. Cyber Security Situational Assessment 
As previously mentioned, cyber security is an aspect of tactical network 
administrator training. Attributes of cyber security could be incorporated into 
MAVNATT’s relational schema to provide cyber situational assessment of both the 
physical and virtual networks, but the necessary attributes to manage and track would need 
to be researched and identified first. This would not be a trivial work as processes running 
within encrypted spaces may be impossible to access. However, there are a great many 
indicators that can be used to detect malicious activity. The resulting attributes required to 
make that detection and create cyber security situational assessment may be very large, 
which would make the display of those attributes to the user problematic. To convey this 
aspect of cyber situational assessment efficiently would then require that MAVNATT 
process and condense individual attributes into a manageable report. This processing and 
condensing of information will require various algorithms to be developed to pull meaning 
out of the attributes. Those algorithms could then be applied to machine learning to 
efficiently create that meaning. 
3. Difference Engine Research and Construction 
As the number of attributes that MAVNATT’s relational schema tracks and 
manages grows, so too will the difficulty in displaying to the user the differences between 
the operational and virtual versions of these attributes. An efficient and dynamic difference 
engine that can incorporate with MAVNATT’s Awareness Module will be crucial to 
ensuring that cyber situational assessment is efficiently conveyed to the user.
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Command VirtualBox Command Attributes 
1 After Medium 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware Audio Support Type modifyvm --audio none|null|dsound|oss|alsa|pulse|coreaudio 
2 After Medium 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware Audio Controller modifyvm --audiocontroller ac97|hda|sb16 
3 After Medium 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware Audio Input On/Off modifyvm --audioin on  
4 After Medium 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware Audio Output On/Off modifyvm --audioout on  
5 After Medium 8.8.1/136 Numerical Hardware CPU # of cores modifyvm --cpus <cpucount> 
6 After High 8.8.1/136 Logical Hardware CPU Type modifyvm --cpu-profile <host|intl 80[86|286|386]> 
7 Informational None   Informational Hardware CPU Manufacturer    
8 Informational None   Informational Hardware CPU Model    
9 After High 8.8.1/138 Logical Hardware Firmware Type modifyvm --firmware bios|efi|efi32|efi64 
10 After High 8.8.1/138 Logical Hardware Firmware Boot Order modifyvm --boot <1-4> none|floppy|dvd|disk|net 
11 After Medium 8.8.1/136 Numerical Hardware Graphics VRAM Size modifyvm --vram <vramsize> 
12 After Medium 8.8.1/138 Logical Hardware Graphics Controller Type modifyvm --graphicscontroller none|vboxvga|vmsvga|vboxsvga 
13 After Low 8.8.3/141 Logical Hardware Input Device Mouse modifyvm --mouse <ps2|usb|usbtablet|usbmultitouch> 
14 After Low 8.8.3/141 Logical Hardware Input Device Keyboard modifyvm --keyboard <ps2|usb> 
15 Informational None   Informational Hardware Memory Manufacturer    
16 Informational None   Informational Hardware Memory Type/Model    
17 After Medium 8.8.1/136 Numerical Hardware Memory Size modifyvm --memory <memorysize> 
18 Informational None   Informational Hardware Motherboard Manufacturer    
19 Informational None   Informational Hardware Motherboard Type/Model    





















Command VirtualBox Command Attributes 
21 After High 8.8.1/136 Logical Hardware Motherboard I/O modifyvm --ioapic on|off 
22 After High   Logical Hardware Networking 
NIC Device 
Numbers  <1-N> = 1 thru 8 




24 After High 8.8.2/139 Logical Hardware Networking Mode modifyvm 
--nic<1-N> 
none|null|nat|natnetwork|bridged|intnet|hostonly|generic 
25 After High 8.8.2/139 Logical Software Networking Promiscuity modifyvm --nicpromisc<1-N> deny|allow-vms|allow-all 
26 After High 8.8.2/139 Logical Software Networking Boot Priority modifyvm --nicbootprio<1-N> <priority> 
27 After High   Logical Software Networking IP Address    
28 After High   Logical Software Networking DNS    
29 After High   Logical Software Networking Gateway    
30 After High 8.8.2/140 Logical  Software Networking MAC Address modifyvm --macaddress<1-N> auto|<mac> 
31 After High   Logical Software Networking Routing Table    
32 After High   Logical Software Networking Firewall Config    
33 After High 8.8.2/140 Logical  Software Networking 
Vbox Internal 
Networking modifyvm --intnet<1-N> network 
33 After High 8.8.2/140 Logical  Software Networking 
NAT Network 
Name modifyvm --nat-network<1-N> <network name> 
33 After High 
8.8.2.1 
/140 Logical  Software Networking NAT IP Range modifyvm --natnet<1-N> <network>|default 
34 After High 
8.8.2.1/ 







35 Upon High 8.44/204 Logical  Software OS login 
unattended 
install --user=<login> 
36 Upon High 8.44/204 Logical  Software OS password 
unattended 
install --password=<password> 
37 Upon Low 8.44/204 Logical  Software OS user name 
unattended 
install --full-user-name=<name> 























Command VirtualBox Command Attributes 
39 Upon High 8.44/204 Logical  Software OS Locale 
unattended 
install --locale=<ll_CC> 
40 Upon High 8.44/204 Logical  Software OS Country Code 
unattended 
install --country=<CC> 
41 Upon High 8.44/204 Logical Software OS Time Zone 
unattended 
install --time-zone=<tz> 
42 Upon High 8.44/204 Logical Software OS Hostname 
unattended 
install --hostname=<fqdn> 
43 After Medium   Numerical Software OS Swap File Size    
44 After High 8.13/151 Informational Software OS Frontend modifyvm --defaultfrontend default|<name> 
45 After High   Logical Software OS Startup Apps    
46 Informational High   Logical Software OS Verison    
47 Upon Low 8.7/135 Informational Software OS VM Name createvm name <name> 
48 After Low 8.8/135 Informational Software OS VM Description modifyvm --description <desc> 
49 After High   Logical Software OS/Storage 
Volume Drive 
Path/Letter    
50 After Medium   Logical Software OS/Storage Volume Name    
51 After Low   Numerical Software OS/Storage Volume Size    
52 After High 8.8.3/141 Logical Hardware Ports Serial Port modifyvm --uart<1-N> off|<I/O base> <IRQ>  
53 After High 8.8.3/141 Logical Hardware Ports Serial Mode modifyvm --uartmode<1-N> <arg> 
54 After High 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware Ports LPT Mode modifyvm --lptmode<1-N> <Device> 
55 After High 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware Ports LPT modifyvm --lpt<1-N> <I/O base> <IRQ>  
56 Informational None   Informational Hardware Storage Manufacturer    
57 Upon High 8.20/164 Informational Hardware Storage Ctrl 
Storage Ctrl 
Name storagectl name <name> 
58 Upon High 8.20/164 logical Hardware Storage Ctrl Storage Type storagectl --add ide|sata|scsi|floppy|sas|usb|pcie 
























Command VirtualBox Command Attributes 
60 Upon High 8.20/164 Logical Hardware Storage Ctrl 
Storage Port 
Count storagectl --portcount <1-30> 
61 Upon High 8.20/164 Logical Hardware Storage Ctrl 
Storage Host I/
O Cache storagectl --hostiocache on|off 
62 Upon High 8.20/164 Logical Hardware Storage Ctrl 
Bootable 
Storage Ctrl storagectl --bootable on|off 
63 After High 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware USB Version 1 modifyvm --usb on|off  
64 After High 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware USB Version 2 modifyvm --usbehci on|off  
65 After High 8.8.3/142 Logical Hardware USB Version 3 modifyvm --usbxhci on|off  
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APPENDIX B. MAVNATT SCHEMA DESIGN 
 
Figure 9. Relational Schema Diagram—View 1 of 4. 
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Figure 10. Relational Schema Diagram—View 2 of 4. 
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APPENDIX C. MAVNATT SCHEMA DESCRIPTION 
Note: The schema description that follows refers to, but does not describe, the 
lookup tables used to supply options to the parent table. All lookup tables have an ‘id’ field 
for their first field and then the option criteria as the second field. Refer to the SQL code 
(Appendix D) for additional table and field details. 
a. Table: Node 
This table is central to the schema and provides access to all of the details of a node. 
It is expected that various nodes will have hardware and software configurations in 
common between them. To efficiently make use of database storage space and clarify the 
schema, only data that is unique to the node is stored within the table. All of the other fields 
within this table reference other tables so that many nodes may reuse the information. 
Unique constraints can be placed on the ‘node’ field alone to ensure the node does not 
become duplicated, but could also be tied to fields ‘d0’ and ‘d1’ in the event nodal names 
from the topological maps were simply copied over vice uniquely modified. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
because MAVNATT is expected to handle more than 255 nodes. 
2. node_short_desc (A#:47): text-based name of the node from ‘node id’ in 
the GraphML file (maximum of 255 characters). 
3. d0: y coordinate from the GraphML file. 
4. d1: x coordinate from the GraphML file. 
5. d2: device type from the GraphML file; looks up the node’s basic device 
type from the table: ‘device_type’. 
6. d3: operating system description from the GraphML file; stored in 
referenced table ‘os_description’. 
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7. cpu: nodes’s VirtualBox (VBox) cpu profile; stored in referenced table 
‘cpu’. 
8. gpu: nodes’s VBox graphics profile; stored in referenced table ‘gpu’. 
9. firmware (A#:9): node’s VBox firmware profile; stored in referenced 
table ‘firmware’. 
10. audio: node’s VBox audio profile; stored in referenced table ‘audio’. 
11. sys_memory: node’s VBox memory profile; stored in referenced table 
‘sys_memory’. 
12. inputs: node’s VBox input profile; stored in referenced table ‘inputs’. 
13. motherboard: node’s VBox motherboard profile; stored in referenced 
table ‘motherboard’. 
14. usb: node’s VBox device usb profile; stored in referenced table ‘usb’. 
15. sys_storageclt: node’s VBox drive storage controller profile; stored in 
referenced table ‘sys_storageclt’. 
16. os_volume: OS storage volume details specific to the node; stored in 
referenced table ‘os_volume’. 
17. os_details: OS details specific to the node; stored in referenced table 
‘os_details’. 
18. user_details: user account details specific to the node; stored in 
referenced table ‘user_details’. 
19. routing_table (A#:31): node’s networking routing table file contents 
(maximum of 65,535 characters). 
20. firewall_config (A#:32): node’s networking firewall configuration file 
contents (maximum of 65,535 characters). 
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21. node_long_desc (A#:48): long detailed description of the node (maximum 
of 65,535 characters). 
22. xml_filepath: location of the XML file containing all of the settings for 
the VM (maximum of 255 characters). 
 
b. Table: Topology 
The topology table contains the individual portions of the network topology for 
each node; derived from the GraphML file. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
because MAVNATT is not expected to scan very large networks greater 
than 10,000 nodes. 
2. edge_source: refers to a node and looks this up from the table: ‘node’. 
3. target_node: refers to a node and looks this up from the table: ‘node’. 
4. d6: the IP address of the node, limited to 15 characters. 
5. d7: the destination interface for the node, limited to 64 characters. 
6. d8: the IP address of the destination, limited to 15 characters. 
7. d9: the nodal interface used to connect to the distant interface (d7). 
 
c. Table: os_description 
The OS Description table contains two text fields and is used to store the basic 
description of the OS and the location of the image that can build a node. Recommend 




1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the expected amount of operating systems within the network is 
expected to be less than 255. 
2. d3: textual description of the node’s operating system; from the GraphML 
file. Expected string length is 64 characters. 
3. d10: location of the image of the operating system which can build the 
node; from the GraphML file. Expected string length is less than 255 
characters. 
4. version (A#:46): the specific version number of the OS; field length is 64 
characters. 
 
d. Table: cpu 
The cpu table references one supporting table to ensure that additional options 
which VBox cannot recognize are not accidentally added to the database. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the expected variance of CPUs is expected to be less than 255 on any 
given tactical network. 
2. manufacturer (A#:7): the manufacturer of the CPU. 
3. cpu_model (A#:8): the model of the CPU. 
4. cpu_profile (A#:6): the CPU emulation mode for the node; looks up 
available entries from table: ‘cpu_type’. 
5. cores (A#:5): the number of virtual CPUs available to the node. For 
VirtualBox v6, the maximum is 32 CPUs. 
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e. Table Group: gpu 
The GPU table references one supporting table to ensure that additional options 
which VBox cannot recognize are not accidentally added to the database. 
Fields for Table: gpu 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the expected amount of graphics configurations is expected to be 
less than 255. 
2. gpu_type (A#:12): the graphics controller type VBox should emulate for 
the node; looks up available entries from table: ‘gpu_controller’. 4 current 
options: none|vboxvga|vmsvga|vboxsvga. 
3. vram_size (A#:11): the amount of video RAM in MB to allocated to the 
node. 
Fields for Table: gpu_controller 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the expected amount of graphics configurations is expected to be less 
than 255. 
2. controller (A#:12): the audio hardware controller type, 16 characters. This 
field is empty in physical database, pre-filled in the virtual database, and 
meant to hold the corresponding physical database value in the baseline 
database. 
3. controller_v (baseline ONLY) (A#:12): the audio hardware controller 
types recognized by VBox. This field looks up from table: 
‘v_gpu_controller’. 
Note: Fields 2 and 3 of this table in the baseline database combine to form a unique 
field to prevent duplicate entries. 
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f. Table: firmware 
This table is a lookup for the table: ‘node’ to ensure that only the necessary options 
which VBox can recognize are available. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since there are only four options. 
2. firm_type (A#:9): specifies the firmware type VBox should emulate for 
the node. 
 
g. Table Group: Audio 
The Audio table references three supporting tables to reduce data redundancy and 
ensure that additional options which VBox cannot recognize are not accidentally added to 
the database. 
Fields for Table: audio 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the expected amount of audio type available to VirtualBox is 
currently seven. 
2. audio_type (A#:1): the audio support to be given to the node from VBox; 
looks up available entries from table: ‘audio_support_type’. 
3. controller (A#:2): the audio controller used for the audio; looks up 
available entries from table: ‘audio_controller’. 
4. input (A#:3): turns audio capture on or off for the VM; looks up available 
entries from table: ‘dev_state’. 
5. output (A#:4): turns audio playback on or off for the VM; looks up 
available entries from table: ‘dev_state’. 
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Fields for Table: audio_support_type 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the amount of audio support types is seven. 
2. support_type (A#:1): the audio hardware support type, 16 characters. This 
field is empty in the physical database, pre-filled in the virtual database, and 
meant to hold the corresponding physical database value in the baseline 
database. 
3. support_type_v (baseline ONLY) (A#:1): one of the seven audio 
hardware support types recognized by VBox. This field looks up from table: 
‘v_audio_support_types’. 
Note: Fields 2 and 3 of this table in the baseline database combine to form a unique 
field to prevent duplicate entries. 
Fields for Table: audio_controller 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the amount of audio support types is three. 
2. controller (A#:2): the audio hardware controller type, 16 characters. This 
field is empty in the physical database, pre-filled in the virtual database, and 
meant to hold the corresponding physical database value in the baseline 
database. 
3. controller_v (baseline ONLY) (A#:2): one of the three audio hardware 
controller options recognized by VBox. This field looks up from table: 
‘v_audio_controller’. 
Note: Fields 2 and 3 of this table in the baseline database combine to form a unique 
field to prevent duplicate entries. 
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h. Table: sys_memory 
The System Memory table contains several attributes of the node’s memory. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the expected amount of memory configurations on the network is 
less than 255. 
2. manufacturer (A#:15): the name of the memory vendor. 
3. mem_model (A#:16): the model of the memory. 
4. mem_size (A#:17): the amount of memory in MB that is allocated to the 
node. 
 
i. Table Group: Inputs 
The Inputs table group references two supporting tables to ensure that only the 
necessary options which VBox can recognize are available. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of input combinations is less than 255. 
2. keyboard (A#:14): the keyboard device VBox should emulate for the 
node; looks up available entries from table: ‘keyboard_dev’. 
3. mouse (A#:13): the mouse device VBox should emulate for the node; 
looks up available entries from table: ‘mouse_dev’. 
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j. Table: motherboard 
The Motherboard table references one other table to ensure that only the necessary 
options which VBox can recognize are available. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of motherboard combinations is less than 255. 
2. manufacturer (A#:18): name of the motherboard manufacturer. 
3. mb_model (A#:19): motherboard model. 
4. apci (A#:20): enables APCI support for the node and is required for 64-bit 
operating systems; looks up available entries from table: ‘dev_state’. 
5. ioapci (A#:21): enables I/O APCI support for the node and is required for 
64-bit operating systems; looks up available entries from table: 
‘dev_state’. 
 
k. Table Group: usb 
The USB table specifies which USB controllers are available to the node. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type TINYINT UNSIGNED since 
the number of option combinations is less than 255. 
2. usb (A#:63): turns on or off the USB controller to the node; looks up 
available states from table: ‘dev_state’. 
3. usbehci (A#:64): turns on or off the USBEHCI controller to the node; 
looks up available states from table: ‘dev_state’. 
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4. usbxhci (A#:65): turns on or off the USBXHCI controller to the node; 
looks up available states from table: ‘dev_state’. 
 
l. Table Group: System Storage Controller 
The System Storage Controller table group contains the details for the 
configurations of the node’s storage controllers for all storage devices. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the unique configurations per node may be large. 
2. manufacturer (A#:56): the manufacturer of the storage controller. 
3. controller_name (A#:57): the name of the storage controller; indexed to 
ensure required uniqueness for VBox. 
4. storage_type (A#:58): the type of storage device VBox should emulated 
for the VM; looks up available entries from table: ‘storage_type’. 
5. controller_type (A#:59): the type of storage controller VBox should 
emulate for the VM; looks up available entries from table: 
‘storage_controller’. 
6. port_count (A#:60): the amount of ports that the controller should have. 
7. hostiocache (A#:61): host IO cache on or off. 
8. bootable_ctl (A#:62): allows the controller to be used as a boot option. 
Fields for Table: controller_type 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of storage controller types for VBox is ten. 
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2. device (A#:59): the storage controller type, 16 characters. This is empty in 
the physical database, pre-filled in the virtual database, and meant to hold 
the corresponding physical database value in the baseline database. 
3. device_v (A#:59): one of the ten storage controller options recognized by 
VBox. This field looks up from table: ‘v_storage_controller’. 
Note: Fields 2 and 3 of this table in the baseline database combine to form a unique 
field to prevent duplicate entries. 
 
m. Table: os_volume 
The OS Volume table contains the details about the storage volumes specific to the 
node’s OS. 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of expected volumes may be large, depending on the 
accuracy of the virtualization. 
2. volume_path (A#:49): logical volume path (64 characters) 
3. volume_name (A#:50): human readable volume name (64 characters) 
4. volume_size (A#:51): the size, in MB, the OS should allocate to the 
virtual storage device assigned to the VM; uses MEDIUMINT 
UNSIGNED data type. 
 
n. Table Group: OS Details 
The OS Details table group contains the details specific to a particular node’s 
operating system. Row entries may all be unique. 
Fields 
 72 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of expected configurations should be no greater than the 
amount of expected nodes within the network. 
2. product_key (A#:38): the product key. 
3. locale (A#:39): the base locale for the node (ex: en_US). 
4. country (A#:40): the two letter country code for the node. 
5. time_zone (A#:41): time_zone for the node. 
6. hostname (A#:42): hostname for the node. 
7. swap_size (A#:43): swap partition size for the node’s operating system. 
Data type is MEDIUMINT UNSIGNED to provide ample allocation. 
8. frontend (A#:44): used to specify the frontend that the node’s operating 
system will use. 
9. startup_apps (A#:45): list of the startup apps for the node; looks up from 
table: ‘startup_apps’ as the list may be identical across several nodes. Data 
type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED in case every node has a unique set of 
startup apps. 
 
o. Table: user_details 
The User Details table contains the details specific to a particular node’s user 
account. 
Fields 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of expected configurations should be no greater than the 
number of expected nodes within the network. 
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2. login (A#:35): the login of the user for the node; set to a length of 24 
characters. 
3. password (A#:36): the password for the user’s login for the node; set to a 
length of 32 characters. 
4. user_name (A#:37): the full name on the node’s user account; set to a 
length of 48 characters. 
 
p. Table Group: Boot Device Order 
The Boot Device Order table group is meant to provide a way to set the order in 
which the node tries at most four unique devices upon boot up and has no ‘id’ field. This 
process starts with ensuring unique combinations of the ‘fkey_node’ and ‘dev_pri’ fields 
within table: ‘boot_priorities’. ‘fkey_node’ references to table ‘node’, ensuring that a boot 
priority is assigned to a preexisting node. To ensure that only four priorities (1-4) are 
selectable, the ‘dev_pri’ field references a table that only has those values available. Table: 
‘boot_order’ can then ensure unique combinations of ‘id’ from ‘boot_priorities’ and 
‘device’ from table: ‘boot_device’ to complete the boot order. 
Fields for Table: ‘boot_priorities’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of node-boot device combinations is expected to be less 
than 65,535 for 10,000 nodes. 
2. fkey_node: the ‘id’ of the node; referenced from table: ‘node’. 
3. dev_pri (A#:10): contains a priority number; looks up from table: 
‘priorities’ 
Unique combinations of the fields (fkey_node, dev_pri) are used to ensure only one 
priority is assigned to a node. 
Fields for Table: ‘boot_order’ 
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1. fkey_boot_priority: refers to ‘id’ field in table: ‘bootPriorities’. 
2. fkey_boot_device: contains the device to assign to a boot priority; looks 
up from table: ‘boot_device’ (A#:10). 
These two fields together are used as a primary key to ensure only unique 
combinations are allowed. 
 
q. Table Group: NIC Assignments 
The Network Interface Card (NIC) Assignment table group associates a node with 
up to eight NICs, which is the maximum number that VirtualBox will support per VM. 
This process of associating eight unique NICs with a particular node starts with ensuring 
unique combinations of the ‘fkey_node’ and ‘dev_num’ fields within table: 
‘node_nic_num’. ‘fkey_node’ references to table ‘node’, ensuring that the NIC is assigned 
to a preexisting node. To ensure that only eight NICs (numbers 1–8) can be assigned, the 
‘dev_num’ field references a table that only has those values available. Table: 
‘nic_assignment’ can then ensure unique combinations of the ‘id’ fields from table 
‘node_nic_num’ and table ‘nic’ to complete the assignment. 
Each NIC can also have network address translation (NAT) rules assigned to it. A 
NIC is tied to multiple NAT rules via junction table ‘nat_rule_assignment’, which contains 
unique combinations of the foreign keys that reference the ‘id’ fields of tables ‘nic’ and 
‘nat_rules’. 
Fields for Junction Table: ‘nic_assignment’ 
1. fkey_node_nic: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of table 
‘node_nic_num’. 
2. fkey_nic: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of table ‘nic’. 
These two fields together are used as a primary key to ensure only unique 
combinations are allowed. 
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Fields for junction table: ‘node_nic_num’ 
1. fkey_node: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of the node from 
table: ‘node’. 
2. dev_num (A#:22): the single digit assignment (1-8) of the NIC to the 
node; looks up from ‘dev_num’ from table: ‘nic_dev_num’. 
These two fields together are used as a constraint to ensure that a node can only 
have eight unique NICs. 
Fields for Table: ‘nic’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of uniquely defined NICs within the network is expected 
to be more than 255 for 1,000 nodes. 
2. nic_type (A#:23): the NIC type for VBox to emulate; looks up from 
‘device’ of table: ‘nic_hardware_type’. 
3. nic_mode (A#:24): the networking mode assigned to the NIC; looks up 
from ‘mode’ of table: ‘nic_hardware_mode’. 
4. promisc (A#:25): promiscuity option for the NIC; looks up from ‘option’ 
of table: ‘nic_promiscuity’. 
5. boot_pri (A#:26): a single digit number indicating network boot priority; 
looks up from ‘priority’ of table: ‘nic_boot_priorities’. 
6. nic_network: the network the NIC is to connect to; details stored in table 
‘nic_network’. 
7. ip_addr (A#:27): the IP Address assigned to the NIC. 
8. netmask (A#:28): the subnet mask of the IP Address. 
9. gateway (A#:29): the gateway the NIC should use. 
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10. mac_addr (A#:30): the MAC address assigned to the NIC. 
Fields for Table: ‘nic_hardware_type’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of NIC hardware types for VBox is six. 
2. device (A#:23): the NIC hardware controller, 16 characters. This is empty 
in the physical database, pre-filled in the virtual database, and meant to hold 
the corresponding physical database value in the baseline database. 
3. device_v (A#:23): one of the six NIC hardware controller options 
recognized by VBox. This field looks up from table: 
‘v_nic_hardware_type’. 
Note: Fields 2 and 3 of this table in the baseline database combine to form a unique 
field to prevent duplicate entries. 
Fields for Table: ‘nic_network’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number network assignments is expected to be less than 65,535 
for 1,000 nodes. 
2. net_num (A#:33): the number VBox uses to refer to a network name. 
3. net_name (A#:33): the network name the NIC is assigned to, which can 
be either a VBox internal network or a NAT network. The name itself can 
be expected to be an IP address or a user defined name. 
Note: This table could be optimized to record unique sets of ‘net_num’ and 
‘net_name’ if ‘net_name’ was constrained to be unique and then ‘net_num’ and ‘net_name’ 
pairs were constrained to be unique, but is overly complex for this application. It may 
become necessary if MAVNATT is expected to handle a larger or more complex network. 
Fields for Junction Table: ‘nat_rule_assignment’ 
1. fkey_nic: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of table ‘nic’. 
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2. fkey_nat_rule: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of table 
‘nat_rules’. 
These two fields together are used as a primary key to ensure only unique 
combinations are allowed. 
Fields for Table: ‘nat_rules’ (A#:34) 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number network assignments is expected to be less than 65,535 
for 1,000 nodes. 
2. rule_num: the number VBox uses to refer to a NAT rule. Data type is 
SMALLINT UNSIGNED since the number NAT rules is expected to be 
less 65,535. 
3. rule_name: the user assigned name to the rule; 32 characters. 
4. protocol: TCP or UDP protocol; looks up from ‘protocol’ field of table 
‘protocols’. 
5. hostip: the optional host IP address the rule will apply to. 
6. hostport: the host port traffic will be coming from. 
7. guestip: the guest IP address where traffic will be sent to. 
8. guestport: the guest port traffic will be sent to. 
r. Table Group: Serial Ports 
The Serial Ports table group associates the node with at most four serial ports as 
that is all VirtualBox supports per VM. This process starts with ensuring unique 
combinations of the ‘fkey_node’ and ‘dev_num’ fields within table: ‘node_serial_ports’. 
‘fkey_node’ references to table ‘node’, ensuring that a serial port is assigned to a 
preexisting node. To ensure that only four serial ports can be assigned, the ‘dev_num’ field 
references table: ‘serial_dev_num’ which only has values “1,2,3,4” available. Table: 
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‘serial_ports’ can then ensure unique combinations of ‘id’ from table: ‘node_serial_ports’ 
and ‘id’ from table: ‘serial_port_config’ to complete the serial port assignment. 
Fields for Table: ‘node_serial_ports’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number serial port assignments is expected to be less than 65,535 
for 1,000 nodes. 
2. fkey_node: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of the node from 
table: ‘node’. 
3. dev_num: contains a number; looks up from table: ‘serial_dev_num’. 
Fields for Table: ‘serial_ports’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number serial port assignments is expected to be less than 65,535 
for 1,000 nodes. 
2. fkey_node_serial: refers to ‘id’ field in table: ‘node_serial_ports’. 
3. fkey_port_config: contains the device configuration to assign to a node’s 
serial port; looks up from table: ‘serial_port_config’. 
Fields for Table: ‘serial_port_config’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is SMALLINT UNSIGNED 
since the number serial port assignments is expected to be less than 65,535 
for 1,000 nodes. 
2. io_base (A#:52): I/O base number for the port configuration. 
3. irq (A#:52): interrupt number for the port configuration. 
4. serial_mode (A#:53): argument for the VBox modifyvm --uartmode 
attribute. 
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s. Table Group: LPT Ports 
The LPT Ports table group associates the node with all of the parallel ports that 
pertain to it. VirtualBox provides access to the parallel ports on the host to the VM, which 
means that the VM can have as many parallel ports as are available. 
Fields for Table ‘lpt’ 
1. fkey_node: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ of the node from 
table: ‘node’. 
2. fkey_lpt_config: Contains a foreign key referencing the ‘id’ from the 
table: ‘lpt_config’. 
Fields for Table ‘lpt_config’ 
1. id: auto incremented, primary key. Data type is TINYINT UNSIGNED 
since the number of expected LPT configurations is less than 255. 
2. lpt_mode (A#:54): the host’s device name of the parallel port to use. 64 
characters have been initially allocated for the value. 
3. io_base (A#:55): a hexadecimal value for the I/O Base used to access the 
parallel port. 
4. irq (A#:55): a single digit decimal number for the interrupt used to access 
the parallel port. 
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APPENDIX D. MAVNATT SCHEMA SQL CODE 
A. SCHEMA BUILD CODE 
This code is intended to be used to create the physical, baseline, and virtual 
databases with in MAVNATT’s relational database system. The following commands must 
be used prior to running the schema generation code below for each database: 
 
CREATE DATABASE physical; 
USE physical; 
< SQL Schema Generation Code (Section B) > 
 
CREATE DATABASE baseline; 
USE baseline; 
< SQL Schema Generation Code (Section B) > 
< Baseline Schema Alteration Code (Section C) > 
< Baseline Database Lookup Table Insertion Code (Section D) > 
 
CREATE DATABASE virtual; 
USE virtual; 
< SQL Schema Generation Code (Section B) > 
< Virtual Database Lookup Table Insertion Code (Section E) > 
 
Note: Two dashes are used to make comments in SQL. 
B. SQL SCHEMA GENERATION CODE 
-- 1 Device Type Table 
CREATE TABLE device_type ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    d2 VARCHAR(16), -- node device types 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 OS Description Table 
CREATE TABLE os_description ( -- supplies node(d3) 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    d3 VARCHAR(64), 
    d10 VARCHAR(255), 
    os_version VARCHAR(64), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 Firmware Table 
CREATE TABLE firmware ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    firm_type VARCHAR(16), 




-- 1 System Memory Table 
CREATE TABLE sys_memory ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    manufacturer VARCHAR(16), 
    mem_model VARCHAR(16), 
    mem_size MEDIUMINT UNSIGNED, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 3 Input Tables: keyboard_dev, mouse_dev, inputs 
CREATE TABLE keyboard_dev ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    keyb_type VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE mouse_dev ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    mouse_type VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE inputs ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    keyboard TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    mouse TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (keyboard) REFERENCES keyboard_dev(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (mouse) REFERENCES mouse_dev(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 2 CPU Tables: cpu_type, cpu 
CREATE TABLE cpu_type ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    emulation VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE cpu ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    manufacturer VARCHAR(16), 
    cpu_model VARCHAR(16), 
    cpu_profile TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    cores TINYINT UNSIGNED,   -- limited to 32 cores in 
VirtualBox 
    FOREIGN KEY (cpu_profile) REFERENCES cpu_type(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 2 GPU Tables: gpu_controller, gpu 
CREATE TABLE gpu_controller ( 
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    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    controller VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE gpu ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    gpu_type TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    vram_size TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (gpu_type) REFERENCES gpu_controller(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- State Table: REFERENCED by Audio, Motherboard, and USB 
branches 
-- MUST be created prior to the others! 
CREATE TABLE dev_state ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    on_off_state VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 3 Audio Tables: audio_support_type, audio_controller, audio 
CREATE TABLE audio_support_type ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    support_type VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE audio_controller ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    controller VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE audio ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    audio_type TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    controller TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    input TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    output TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (audio_type) REFERENCES audio_support_type(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (controller) REFERENCES audio_controller(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (input) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (output) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 Motherboard Table 
CREATE TABLE motherboard ( 
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    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    manufacturer VARCHAR(16), 
    mb_model VARCHAR(16), 
    apci TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    ioapci TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (apci) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (ioapci) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 USB Table 
CREATE TABLE usb ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    usb TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    usbehci TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    usbxhci TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (usb) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (usbehci) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (usbxhci) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 3 Storage Controller Tables: storage_type, storage_controller,  
-- sys_storagectl 
CREATE TABLE storage_type ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    strg_type VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE storage_controller ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    ctrl_type VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE sys_storagectl ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    manufacturer VARCHAR(64), 
    controller_name VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL, 
    storage_type TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    controller_type TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    port_count TINYINT UNSIGNED, -- limited to range of 1–30 
    hostiocache TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    ctl_bootable TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (storage_type) REFERENCES storage_type(id) ON 
UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (controller_type) REFERENCES 
storage_controller(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (hostiocache) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
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ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (ctl_bootable) REFERENCES dev_state(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    CONSTRAINT storagectl_controller_name UNIQUE 
(controller_name), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 OS Volume Details Table 
CREATE TABLE os_volume ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    volume_path VARCHAR(64), 
    volume_name VARCHAR(64), 
    volume_size MEDIUMINT UNSIGNED, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 User Details Table 
CREATE TABLE user_details ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    login VARCHAR(24), 
    password VARCHAR(32), 
    user_name VARCHAR(48), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 2 OS Detail Tables: startup_apps, os_details 
CREATE TABLE startup_apps ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    app_list VARCHAR(255), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE os_details ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    product_key VARCHAR(255), 
    locale VARCHAR(10), 
    country VARCHAR(2), 
    time_zone VARCHAR(16), 
    hostname VARCHAR(255), 
    swap_size MEDIUMINT UNSIGNED, 
    frontend VARCHAR(64), 
    startup_apps SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (startup_apps) REFERENCES startup_apps(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 Node Table 
CREATE TABLE node ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    node_short_desc VARCHAR(255), 
    d0 SMALLINT UNSIGNED, -- y coord 
    d1 SMALLINT UNSIGNED, -- x coord 
    d2 TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
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    d3 TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    cpu TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    gpu TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    firmware TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    audio TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    sys_memory TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    inputs TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    motherboard TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    usb TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    sys_storagectl SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    os_volume SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    os_details SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    user_details SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    routing_table TEXT, 
    firewall_config TEXT, 
    node_long_desc TEXT, 
    xml_filepath VARCHAR(255), 
    FOREIGN KEY (d2) REFERENCES device_type(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (d3) REFERENCES os_description(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (cpu) REFERENCES cpu(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (gpu) REFERENCES gpu(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (firmware) REFERENCES firmware(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (audio) REFERENCES audio(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (sys_memory) REFERENCES sys_memory(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (inputs) REFERENCES inputs(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (motherboard) REFERENCES motherboard(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (usb) REFERENCES usb(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE  
ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (sys_storagectl) REFERENCES sys_storagectl(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (os_volume) REFERENCES os_volume(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (os_details) REFERENCES os_details(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (user_details) REFERENCES user_details(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 1 Topology Table 
CREATE TABLE topology ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    edge_source SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    target_node SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    d6 VARCHAR(15), -- node IP address 
    d7 VARCHAR(64), -- destination interface 
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    d8 VARCHAR(15), -- destination IP address 
    d9 VARCHAR(64), -- node’s interface 
    FOREIGN KEY (edge_source) REFERENCES node(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (target_node) REFERENCES node(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
-- 4 Boot Order Tables: priorities, boot_device, boot_priorities,  
-- boot_order 
CREATE TABLE priorities ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    priority TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE boot_device ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    device VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE boot_priorities ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    fkey_node SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    dev_pri TINYINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_node) REFERENCES node(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (dev_pri) REFERENCES priorities(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE boot_order ( 
    fkey_boot_priority SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    fkey_boot_device TINYINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_boot_priority) REFERENCES 
boot_priorities(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_boot_device) REFERENCES boot_device(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (fkey_boot_priority, fkey_boot_device) 
); 
 
-- 4 Serial Port Tables: serial_dev_num, serial_port_config, 
node_serial_ports, serial_ports 
CREATE TABLE serial_dev_num ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    dev_num TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE serial_port_config ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    io_base VARCHAR(5), 
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    irq TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    serial_mode VARCHAR(128), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE node_serial_ports ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    fkey_node SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    dev_num TINYINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_node) REFERENCES node(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (dev_num) REFERENCES serial_dev_num(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    CONSTRAINT uc_node_serial UNIQUE (fkey_node, dev_num), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE serial_ports ( 
    fkey_node_serial SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    fkey_port_config SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_node_serial) REFERENCES 
node_serial_ports(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_port_config) REFERENCES 
serial_port_config(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (fkey_node_serial, fkey_port_config) 
); 
 
-- 2 LPT Port Tables: lpt_config, lpt 
CREATE TABLE lpt_config ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    lpt_mode VARCHAR(64), 
    io_base VARCHAR(5), 
    irq TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE lpt ( 
    fkey_node SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    fkey_lpt_config TINYINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_node) REFERENCES node(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_lpt_config) REFERENCES lpt_config(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (fkey_node, fkey_lpt_config) 
); 
 
-- 8 NIC Tables: nic_dev_num, nic_hardware_type,  
-- nic_hardware_mode, nic_promiscuity, nic_boot_priorities,  
-- nic_network, nic, node_nic_num, nic_assignment 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_dev_num ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    dev_num TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
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    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_hardware_type ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    device VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_hardware_mode ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    nic_mode VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_promiscuity ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    promisc_option VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_boot_priorities ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    priority VARCHAR(16), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_network ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    net_num TINYINT, 
    net_name VARCHAR(32), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    nic_type TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    nic_mode TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    promisc TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    boot_pri TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    nic_network SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    ip_addr VARCHAR(15), 
    netmask VARCHAR(15), 
    gateway VARCHAR(15), 
    mac_addr VARCHAR(17), 
    FOREIGN KEY (nic_type) REFERENCES nic_hardware_type(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (nic_mode) REFERENCES nic_hardware_mode(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (promisc) REFERENCES nic_promiscuity(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (boot_pri) REFERENCES nic_boot_priorities(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (nic_network) REFERENCES nic_network(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
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    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE node_nic_num ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    fkey_node SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    dev_num TINYINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_node) REFERENCES node(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (dev_num) REFERENCES nic_dev_num(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    CONSTRAINT uc_node_nic UNIQUE (fkey_node, dev_num), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nic_assignment ( 
    fkey_node_nic SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    fkey_nic SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_node_nic) REFERENCES node_nic_num(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_nic) REFERENCES nic(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (fkey_node_nic, fkey_nic) 
); 
 
-- 3 NAT Tables: protocols, nat_rules, nat_rule_assignment 
CREATE TABLE protocols ( 
    id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    protocol VARCHAR(10), 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nat_rules ( 
    id SMALLINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
    rule_num SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    rule_name VARCHAR(32), 
    protocol TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
    hostip VARCHAR(15), 
    hostport SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    guestip VARCHAR(15), 
    guestport SMALLINT UNSIGNED, 
    FOREIGN KEY (protocol) REFERENCES protocols(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE nat_rule_assignment ( 
    fkey_nic SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    fkey_nat_rule SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_nic) REFERENCES nic(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    FOREIGN KEY (fkey_nat_rule) REFERENCES nat_rules(id)  
ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE, 
    PRIMARY KEY (fkey_nic, fkey_nat_rule) 
); 
 91 
C. BASELINE SCHEMA ALTERATION CODE 
USE baseline; 
 
CREATE TABLE v_gpu_controller ( 
     id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
     controller_option VARCHAR(16), 
     PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
ALTER TABLE gpu_controller 
     ADD COLUMN controller_v TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
     ADD FOREIGN KEY (controller_v) REFERENCES 
v_gpu_controller(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE, 




CREATE TABLE v_audio_support_types ( 
     id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
     support_option VARCHAR(16), 
     PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
ALTER TABLE audio_support_type 
     ADD COLUMN support_type_v TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
     ADD FOREIGN KEY (support_type_v) REFERENCES 
v_audio_support_types(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
     ADD CONSTRAINT uc_audio_support_phy_vir UNIQUE 
(support_type, support_type_v); 
 
CREATE TABLE v_audio_controller ( 
     id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
     controller_option VARCHAR(16), 
     PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
ALTER TABLE audio_controller 
     ADD COLUMN controller_v TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
     ADD FOREIGN KEY (controller_v) REFERENCES 
v_audio_controller(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
     ADD CONSTRAINT uc_audio_controller_phy_vir UNIQUE 
(controller, controller_v); 
 
CREATE TABLE v_nic_hardware_type ( 
     id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
     device_option VARCHAR(16), 
     PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
ALTER TABLE nic_hardware_type 
     ADD COLUMN device_v TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
     ADD FOREIGN KEY (device_v) REFERENCES 
v_nic_hardware_type(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
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     ADD CONSTRAINT uc_nic_hardware_type_phy_vir UNIQUE (device, 
device_v); 
 
CREATE TABLE v_storage_controller ( 
     id TINYINT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL, 
     ctrl_type_option VARCHAR(16), 
     PRIMARY KEY (id) 
); 
 
ALTER TABLE storage_controller 
     ADD COLUMN ctrl_type_v TINYINT UNSIGNED, 
     ADD FOREIGN KEY (ctrl_type_v) REFERENCES 
v_storage_controller(id) ON UPDATE CASCADE, 
     ADD CONSTRAINT uc_storage_controller_phy_vir UNIQUE 
(ctrl_type, ctrl_type_v); 
 
D. BASELINE DATABASE LOOKUP TABLE INSERTION CODE 
USE baseline; 
 
INSERT INTO v_audio_support_types VALUES 
     (null, “none”), 
     (null, “null”), 
     (null, “dsound”), 
     (null, “oss”), 
     (null, “alsa”), 
     (null, “pulse”), 
     (null, “coreaudio”); 
 
INSERT INTO v_audio_controller VALUES 
     (null, “ac97”), 
     (null, “hda”), 
     (null, “sb16”); 
 
INSERT INTO v_gpu_controller VALUES 
     (null, “none”), 
     (null, “vboxvga”), 
     (null, “vmsvga”), 
     (null, “vboxsvga”); 
 
INSERT INTO v_nic_hardware_type VALUES 
     (null, “Am79C970A”), 
     (null, “Am79C973”), 
     (null, “82540EM”), 
     (null, “82543GC”), 
     (null, “82545EM”), 
     (null, “virtio”); 
 
INSERT INTO v_storage_controller VALUES 
     (null, “LSILogic”), 
     (null, “LSILogicSAS”), 
     (null, “BusLogic”), 
     (null, “IntelAhci”), 
     (null, “PIIX3”), 
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     (null, “PIIX4”), 
     (null, “ICH6”), 
     (null, “I82078”), 
     (null, “USB”), 
     (null, “NVMe”); 
 
INSERT INTO dev_state VALUES 
     (null, “on”), 
     (null, “off”); 
 
INSERT INTO cpu_type VALUES 
     (null, “host”), 
     (null, “intl 80”), 
     (null, “intl 86”), 
     (null, “intl 286”), 
     (null, “intl 386”); 
 
INSERT INTO firmware VALUES 
     (null, “bios”), 
     (null, “efi”), 
     (null, “efi32”), 
     (null, “efi64”); 
 
INSERT INTO mouse_dev VALUES 
     (null, “ps2”), 
     (null, “usb”), 
     (null, “usbtablet”), 
     (null, “usbmultitouch”); 
 
INSERT INTO keyboard_dev VALUES 
     (null, “ps2”), 
     (null, “usb”); 
 
INSERT INTO boot_device VALUES 
     (null, “none”), 
     (null, “floppy”), 
     (null, “dvd”), 
     (null, “disk”), 
     (null, “net”); 
 
INSERT INTO priorities VALUES 
     (null, 1), 
     (null, 2), 
     (null, 3), 
     (null, 4); 
 
INSERT INTO storage_type VALUES 
     (null, “ide”), 
     (null, “sata”), 
     (null, “scsi”), 
     (null, “floppy”), 
     (null, “sas”), 
     (null, “usb”), 
     (null, “pcie”); 
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INSERT INTO serial_dev_num VALUES 
     (null, 1), 
     (null, 2), 
     (null, 3), 
     (null, 4); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_dev_num VALUES 
     (null, 1), 
     (null, 2), 
     (null, 3), 
     (null, 4), 
     (null, 5), 
     (null, 6), 
     (null, 7), 
     (null, 8); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_hardware_mode VALUES 
     (null, “none”), 
     (null, “null”), 
     (null, “nat”), 
     (null, “natnetwork”), 
     (null, “bridged”), 
     (null, “intnet”), 
     (null, “hostonly”), 
     (null, “generic”); 
INSERT INTO nic_promiscuity VALUES 
     (null, “deny”), 
     (null, “allow-vms”), 
     (null, “allow-all”); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_boot_priorities VALUES 
     (null, 0), 
     (null, 1), 
     (null, 2), 
     (null, 3), 
     (null, 4); 
 
INSERT INTO protocols VALUES 
     (null, “TCP”), 
     (null, “UDP”); 
 
E. VIRTUAL DATABASE LOOKUP TABLE INSERTION CODE 
USE virtual; 
 
INSERT INTO audio_support_type VALUES 
    (null, “none”), 
    (null, “null”), 
    (null, “dsound”), 
    (null, “oss”), 
    (null, “alsa”), 
    (null, “pulse”), 
    (null, “coreaudio”); 
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INSERT INTO audio_controller VALUES 
    (null, “ac97”), 
    (null, “hda”), 
    (null, “sb16”); 
 
INSERT INTO dev_state VALUES 
    (null, “on”), 
    (null, “off”); 
 
INSERT INTO cpu_type VALUES 
    (null, “host”), 
    (null, “intl 80”), 
    (null, “intl 86”), 
    (null, “intl 286”), 
    (null, “intl 386”); 
 
INSERT INTO firmware VALUES 
    (null, “bios”), 
    (null, “efi”), 
    (null, “efi32”), 
    (null, “efi64”); 
 
INSERT INTO mouse_dev VALUES 
    (null, “ps2”), 
    (null, “usb”), 
    (null, “usbtablet”), 
    (null, “usbmultitouch”); 
 
INSERT INTO keyboard_dev VALUES 
    (null, “ps2”), 
    (null, “usb”); 
 
INSERT INTO boot_device VALUES 
    (null, “none”), 
    (null, “floppy”), 
    (null, “dvd”), 
    (null, “disk”), 
    (null, “net”); 
 
INSERT INTO priorities VALUES 
    (null, 1), 
    (null, 2), 
    (null, 3), 
    (null, 4); 
 
INSERT INTO gpu_controller VALUES 
    (null, “none”), 
    (null, “vboxvga”), 
    (null, “vmsvga”), 
    (null, “vboxsvga”); 
 
INSERT INTO storage_type VALUES 
    (null, “ide”), 
    (null, “sata”), 
    (null, “scsi”), 
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    (null, “floppy”), 
    (null, “sas”), 
    (null, “usb”), 
    (null, “pcie”); 
 
INSERT INTO storage_controller VALUES 
    (null, “LSILogic”), 
    (null, “LSILogicSAS”), 
    (null, “BusLogic”), 
    (null, “IntelAhci”), 
    (null, “PIIX3”), 
    (null, “PIIX4”), 
    (null, “ICH6”), 
    (null, “I82078”), 
    (null, “USB”), 
    (null, “NVMe”); 
 
INSERT INTO serial_dev_num VALUES 
    (null, 1), 
    (null, 2), 
    (null, 3), 
    (null, 4); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_dev_num VALUES 
    (null, 1), 
    (null, 2), 
    (null, 3), 
    (null, 4), 
    (null, 5), 
    (null, 6), 
    (null, 7), 
    (null, 8); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_hardware_type VALUES 
    (null, “Am79C970A”), 
    (null, “Am79C973”), 
    (null, “82540EM”), 
    (null, “82543GC”), 
    (null, “82545EM”), 
    (null, “virtio”); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_hardware_mode VALUES 
    (null, “none”), 
    (null, “null”), 
    (null, “nat”), 
    (null, “natnetwork”), 
    (null, “bridged”), 
    (null, “intnet”), 
    (null, “hostonly”), 
    (null, “generic”); 
 
INSERT INTO nic_promiscuity VALUES 
    (null, “deny”), 
    (null, “allow-vms”), 
    (null, “allow-all”); 
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INSERT INTO nic_boot_priorities VALUES 
    (null, 0), 
    (null, 1), 
    (null, 2), 
    (null, 3), 
    (null, 4); 
 
INSERT INTO protocols VALUES 
    (null, “TCP”), 
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APPENDIX E. SQL DEVELOPER SCHEMA ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 13. SQL Developer Code Validation—View 1 of 4. 
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Figure 16. SQL Developer Code Validation—View 4 of 4. 
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